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The Danger Zone:  
How the Dangerousness 
Standard in Civil Commitment 
Proceedings Harms People with 
Serious Mental Illness 
Sara Gordon† 
“It must be remembered that for the person with severe mental 
illness who has no treatment the most dreaded of confinements can 
be the imprisonment inflicted by his own mind, which shuts reality 
out and subjects him to the torment of voices and images beyond 
our own powers to describe.”1 
“Civil libertarians say no—that it is our right to commit crimes 
that land us in prison, that it is our choice to be so ill that we 
prefer to forage through garbage and live on the streets, that it is 
our prerogative to let voices in our heads torment us into sleepless 
nights. But something tells me that the people locked up in San 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas. Thank you to Linda Edwards, Michael Higdon, Ngai 
Pindell, and the participants in the 2014 University of Utah Legal Borders 
and Mental Disorders Law Review Symposium for their helpful comments 
and suggestions. Thanks also to the editors of the Case Western Reserve 
Law Review for valuable editorial suggestions and to Dawn Nielsen, Gil 
Kahn, and Chad Schatzle for excellent research assistance. 
1. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 609–10 (1999) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). In Olmstead, the Court held that under the ADA,  
  States are required to provide community-based treatment for persons 
with mental disabilities when the State’s treatment professionals deter-
mine that such placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not 
oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accomm-
odated, taking into account the resources available to the State and 
the needs of others with mental disabilities.  
 Id. at 607 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, however, 
warned that this holding should be applied with “caution and circumspection” 
so as not to pressure states with “some incentive, for fear of litigation, to drive 
those in need of medical care and treatment out of appropriate care and into 
settings with too little assistance and supervision.” Id. at 610 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Since Olmstead, “[twelve] states and the District of Columbia 
have completely eliminated large state-run [psychiatric facilities].” Liz 
Robbins, For Special-Care Residents, State Policy Means Leaving Home, 
N.Y. Times (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/nyregion/ 
as-new-york-moves-people-with-developmental-disabilities-to-group-homes-
some-families-struggle.html [http://perma.cc/KJF4-FF42]. 
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Quentin with a mental illness, and the people roving the back alleys 
of skid row, are not singing “God Bless America.”2 
Abstract 
Almost every American state allows civil commitment upon a find-
ing that a person, as a result of mental illness, is gravely disabled and 
unable to meet their basic needs for food and shelter. Yet in spite of 
these statutes, most psychiatrists and courts will not commit an indivi-
dual until they are found to pose a danger to themselves or others. All 
people have certain rights to be free from unwanted medical treatment, 
but for people with serious mental illness, those civil liberties are an 
abstraction, safeguarded for them by a system that is not otherwise 
ensuring access to shelter and basic medical care. 
States’ continued and primary use of dangerousness standard in 
civil commitment proceedings does not meet our obligations to people 
with serious mental illness. Continued perceptions of the link between 
mental illness and violence, coupled with the strict interpretation of 
commitment statutes based on states’ parens patriae authority, have 
resulted in commitment standards that effectively commit people only 
when they are dangerous, which is often far past the point that they 
are in need of help. Courts and psychiatrists should recognize states’ 
obligations to provide health care to people with mental illness by inter-
preting gravely disabled statutes to allow for commitment when an 
individual is unable to provide for her basic needs but does not pose a 
danger to herself. 
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2. Jim Randall, Helping Those Who Don’t Know They Want It, L.A. Times 
(Mar. 12, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/mar/12/opinion/oe-
randall12 [http://perma.cc/7F9U-S42F]. 
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Introduction 
Serious mental illness affects approximately 9.6 million people in 
the United States, or about 4.1% of the population.3 In addition to the 
many debilitating symptoms of serious mental illness, many people also 
lack insight into the extent and effects of their symptoms; lack of insight 
is neurologically based and is often a hallmark of serious mental illness.4 
This lack of insight coupled with the complexities of serious mental 
 
3. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Results from the 2012 National 
Survey on Drug Use and Health: Mental Health Findings (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/2k12MH_Findings/ 
2k12MH_Findings/NSDUHmhfr2012.htm [http://perma.cc/6HQ2-V3SN] 
(“SAMHSA defined SMI as persons aged 18 or older who currently or at any 
time in the past year have had a diagnosable mental, behavioral, or emotional 
disorder (excluding developmental and substance use disorders) of sufficient 
duration to meet diagnostic criteria specified within DSM-IV (APA, 1994) 
that has resulted in serious functional impairment, which substantially inter-
feres with or limits one or more major life activities. . . . In 2012, there were 
an estimated 9.6 million adults aged 18 or older in the United States with 
SMI in the past year. This represented 4.1 percent of all adults in this country 
in 2012 . . . . The percentage of adults with past year SMI in 2012 was 
similar to that in 2008 (3.7 percent).”). 
4. Between 57 and 98% of people with schizophrenia have some lack of insight 
into their illness and over 84% of bipolar patients experience lack of insight 
during pure manic phases. Frederick Cassidy, Insight in Bipolar Disorder: 
Relationship to Episode Subtypes and Symptom Dimensions, 6 Neuro-
psychiatric Disease and Treatment 627, 629 (2010); see also E. Fuller 
Torrey, The Insanity Offense: How America’s Failure to Treat 
the Seriously Mentally Ill Endangers Its Citizens 116 (2012). “The 
term anosognosia . . . refers to a neurologically based denial of illness and 
unawareness of disability.” Douglas S. Lehrer & Jennifer Lorenz, Anosognosia 
in Schizophrenia: Hidden in Plain Sight, 11 Innovations in Clinical 
Neuroscience 10, 13 (2014). The authors break down the origin of the term 
anosognosia further, “[A]=without, noso=disease, gnosia=knowledge.” Id. 
at 12–13. Although the exact anatomical basis is still unclear, it appears that 
the frontal and parietal lobes are most affected in people with anosognosia. 
Torrey, supra, at 116 (“The anatomical basis of anosognosia, however, 
should not be oversimplified. Most brain functions utilize circuits involving 
multiple brain areas, and this is certainly true for anosognosia. Thus there is 
no single ‘anosognosia center’; rather, self-awareness is a product of a complex 
circuit prominently involving areas in the frontal and parietal lobes, the 
connections between them, and other brain areas.”). Although this lack of 
insight has been noted in people with serious mental illness throughout 
history, the term was first used to describe people suffering from paralysis 
after a stroke who denied that they were paralyzed. Supreme Court Justice 
William Douglas suffered from anosognosia following a stroke; when he 
became paralyzed on his left side “he initially dismissed the paralysis as a 
myth, and weeks later he was still inviting reporters to go on hiking 
expeditions with him.” James Shreeve, The Brain That Misplaced Its Body, 
Discover Mag. (1995) available at http://discovermagazine.com/1995/ 
may/thebrainthatmisp502 [http://perma.cc/35K2-GXR8]. 
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illness means that people with chronic and long-term illnesses like schiz-
ophrenia and bipolar disorder often need some assistance in order to 
obtain mental health treatment and services.5 Without assistance, whe-
ther from family members, communities, or the state, many are other-
wise largely unable to care for themselves or access appropriate mental 
health care. This lack of access to treatment and resources has led to 
the marginalization of many people with mental illness—to the streets, 
to prisons, and to a variety of situations where they are at higher risk 
of becoming victims of crimes.6 
Before the 1950s, many people with serious mental illness in the 
United States lived for most or all of their lives in state-run institu-
tions.7 But as states began to “deinstitutionalize” inpatient psychiatric 
patients and heighten civil commitment standards, more patients who 
would have previously been treated in a long-term inpatient facility 
were left to find treatment on their own in the community. Well-inten-
tioned civil rights and community mental health advocates believed 
that most people suffering from serious mental illness would be better 
served in their own communities.8 Of course, along with this belief was 
a corresponding expectation that those individuals would voluntarily 
seek that treatment and that treatment would be available to them in 
those communities. 
For some patients with chronic and serious mental illness, however, 
especially those without the resources to obtain care in the community, 
neither of these things happened. Instead, many of these people have 
become “revolving-door patients”; they have a serious mental disorder, 
do not voluntarily comply with treatment, and are unable to live suc-
cessfully in the community without treatment. They often cycle in and 
out of hospital emergency rooms, where they receive the minimum 
amount of care necessary to stabilize them, and are discharged. Long-
term treatment in the community is often unavailable, and without 
that care, many people with serious mental illness live on the streets,  
5. People without such insight into the nature of their illnesses are often unaware 
they have an illness, have difficulty recognizing the symptoms and deficits of 
the illness, and do not understand the need for treatment of the illness. Lehrer 
& Lorenz, supra note 4, at 11. Impaired insight in patients with serious mental 
illness is associated with lower treatment adherence, impaired social skills and 
work performance, higher rates of relapse, and increased violence and suicidal 
behavior. Peter F. Buckley et al., Lack of Insight in Schizophrenia: Impact 
on Treatment Adherence, 21 CNS Drugs 129, 130 (2007). 
6. Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Criminal Victimization of Persons with Severe 
Mental Illness, 50 Psychiatric Servs. 62, 66 (1999) (“The rate of violent 
criminal victimization in the sample was more than two and a half times 
the rate in the general population.”). 
7. Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7 
Psychiatry 30, 32 (2010). 
8. Torrey, supra note 4, at 3–5. 
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commit crimes for which they are sent to prison, or become victims of 
crime themselves. 
Access to appropriate mental health care is a problem with tremen-
dous scope in this country and there is no easy solution. Issues ranging 
from funding, to delivery, to quality of care have led many to conclude 
that the “mental health care system is ‘in shambles.’”9 For some people 
with serious mental illness, however, it is not just a question of the 
delivery or quality of the care they receive; it is that they receive almost 
no mental health services at all. Civil commitment is one way to ensure 
that people who are otherwise not receiving treatment for mental illness 
receive those services. Although most states have statutes that ostens-
ibly allow for commitment when a person is not dangerous to herself or 
others but is nevertheless unable meet her basic needs for food and 
shelter, these standards are often interpreted strictly to require danger-
ousness. In these cases, the individual’s lack of ability to meet her basic 
needs must be so grave that death is likely to result. For this reason, 
some people with untreated serious mental illness do eventually harm 
themselves or another person, further increasing public perceptions of 
a link between mental illness and violence, and stigmatizing those with 
mental illness. Meanwhile, people with serious mental illness who are 
not dangerous often do not have access to appropriate mental health 
care, or the resources to obtain available care. 
This Article proposes that courts and psychiatrists go beyond a 
finding of dangerousness as a predicate for civil commitment, and in-
stead interpret gravely disabled statutes to allow for commitment when 
an individual is unable to provide for her basic needs but does not pose 
a danger to herself. An expansion of civil commitment is far from an 
ideal solution, but it is one that could potentially provide access to 
mental health care and treatment to individuals who will not otherwise 
receive it. 
Part I of this Article traces the history of civil commitment in the 
United States, as well as shifts in attitudes about the role of the state 
in providing mental health care to people with serious mental illness. 
Part II reviews current state statutes and trends relating to civil comm-
itment, including dangerousness and gravely disabled grounds. Part III 
examines the role of psychiatrists and courts in civil commitment pro-
ceedings and the tendency of both to read a dangerousness requirement 
into gravely disabled grounds for commitment. Part IV considers the 
public perception of the link between mental illness and violence and 
argues that this perception has been perpetuated by civil commitment 
statutes that incorporate connections between mental illness and dan-
gerousness. This Part also examines the current research on the lack of 
a direct connection between mental illness and violence. Part V exam-
 
9. Richard G. Frank & Sherry A. Glied, Better but Not Well: 
Mental Health Policy in the United States Since 1950 2 (2006). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016 
The Danger Zone 
662 
ines the effect of deinstitutionalization and heighted commitment stan-
dards on access to mental health treatment for people with serious men-
tal illness. Part VI concludes and recommends that courts and psychia-
trists recognize states’ obligations to provide health care to people with 
serious mental illness by interpreting gravely disabled statutes to allow 
for commitment when an individual is unable to provide for her basic 
needs but does not pose a danger to herself. 
I. The History of Civil Commitment in  
the United States 
The United States has undergone enormous shifts in its treatment 
of people with mental illness, which has taken various forms from a 
more paternalistic model—one that sought to commit people whenever 
they might benefit from intervention—to a more libertarian model, or 
one that seeks to limit any form of commitment to people who might 
harm themselves or other members of society.10 In this way, mental 
health differs markedly from physical health; patients must give inform-
ed consent to medical treatment for any physical disorder and any 
person “of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body.”11 When an illness is mental rather 
than physical, however, the state is empowered by civil commitment 
statutes to impose its decision-making and requirements on that treat-
ment. The scope of that power, however, has long been a subject of 
controversy. 
State intervention in the mental health treatment of citizens in the 
form of civil commitment statutes is a fairly recent development in this 
country. In Colonial America, family members were the source of most 
care for the mentally ill, and those without familial support often form-
ed groups of itinerant “drifters” who moved from town to town.12 If a 
mentally ill person became violent or otherwise posed a threat to the 
community, he was imprisoned.13 Because the family was responsible 
for supporting its members, early examples of community action appear 
limited to attempts to help impoverished families care for their mentally 
 
10. Testa & West, supra note 7, at 32–33. 
11. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). As the 
Supreme Court noted when citing Schloendorff, the informed consent doctrine 
“has become firmly entrenched in American tort law.” Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri 
Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). Furthermore, the Court has found 
this right to be a constitutionally protected liberty. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 
U.S. 127, 133–34 (1992). 
12. Samuel J. Brakel et al., The Mentally Disabled and the Law 12 
(1985). 
13. Id. at 12–13. 
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ill members. In this way, the treatment of the very poor and the men-
tally ill seem quite similar, and were often seen as examples of charity 
to the family, rather than any attempt to help the mentally ill person. 
For example, in 1655, Providence, Rhode Island, gave a man 15 shillings 
“for helpe in this his sad condition of his wife’s distraction.”14 
In 1771, the first mental hospital was established in Pennsylvania 
and communities began to take a more active role in treating the ment-
ally ill; soon state legislatures began passing laws that allowed for the 
involuntary commitment of citizens to state institutions.15 These early 
statutes primarily allowed for the mentally ill to be confined when they 
were violent and posed a danger to themselves or their community, and 
when they did not have relatives who could properly care for them.16 
One of the first cases of commitment of a nonviolent mentally ill person 
was in 1845 in Massachusetts.17 A man named Josiah Oakes was detain-
ed not because he was violent, but because his family believed that 
following the death of his wife, his hallucinations caused him to become 
engaged to a much younger woman of “bad character.”18 The court 
found that his detention was appropriate, both because his illness might 
cause him to take actions harmful to himself, but also because the res-
traint itself might “be conducive” to his restoration.19 
For much of the next two hundred years, civil commitment statutes 
and the ability of the state to confine the mentally ill continued to 
expand. Many scholars attribute this expansion to two primary causes. 
First, as local governments expanded, the view that the family was 
solely obligated to care for its members changed and communities began 
to take a larger role in assuming responsibility for this care. Second, as 
the psychiatric field gained greater prominence, techniques were devel-
oped to help “treat” the mentally ill, and detention began to be seen as 
part of the therapeutic process.20 As treatment for mental illness—and 
 
14. Albert Deutsch, The Mentally Ill in America 49 (1937). 
15. Christopher Slobogin et al., Law and the Mental Health System: 
Civil and Criminal Aspects 804 (5th ed. 2013). 
16. Brakel et al., supra note 12, at 14 (citing a 1788 New York statute that 
noted that “there are sometimes persons, who by lunacy or otherwise are 
furiously madd, or are so far disordered in their senses that they may be 
dangerous to be permitted to go abroad”). 
17. In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845). 
18. Id. at 127 (“The fact of an old man, a widower, wishing to marry a young 
wife, is not of itself evidence of insanity. But the circumstances, and the 
conduct of Mr. Oakes, attending the proposed marriage, are evidence that 
lie was laboring under a hallucination of mind.”). 
19. Id. at 129. 
20. Slobogin et al., supra note 15 at 805–06. As Slobogin notes, one well-known 
exception to this general expansion of commitment authority was a woman 
named Mrs. Packard, who was committed to the Illinois State Hospital in 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016 
The Danger Zone 
664 
optimism about that treatment—continued to develop, mental hospit-
als opened throughout the country.21 Meanwhile, the standard for civil 
commitment continued to loosen and, by 1970, thirty-one states had 
statutes that allowed commitment upon a finding by a physician that 
the person was mentally ill and was in need of treatment.22 
As state commitment standards evolved, courts began to articulate 
two primary legal principles that give states an interest in the civil 
commitment of people with mental illness. The first is the parens 
patriae authority, which gives the state the power—and the respons-
ibility—to intervene on behalf of citizens who cannot act in their own 
best interests.23 The parens patriae authority obligates the state to care 
for people whose mental illness renders them unable to make appro-
priate medical decisions for themselves.24 The second principle is the 
police power, which obligates states to protect the interest of citizens.25 
The state, therefore, owes a duty to people other than the mentally ill 
individual. Statutes that allow for civil commitment when a person is 
believed to be dangerous to others are one example of the state’s exer-
cise of this police power to implement laws that may benefit society at 
large, though at the cost of the individual liberties of the mentally ill 
patient.26 
 
1860 under a statute that allowed for “[m]arried women and infants, who 
in the judgment of the medical superintendent are evidently insane or dis-
tracted, may be received and detained in the hospital at the request of the 
husband . . . without the evidence of insanity or distraction required in other 
cases.” Her commitment was based primarily on the testimony of two doctors, 
one of whom said she was rational, but was a “religious bigot,” and the other 
who said she had “novel” ideas. Mrs. Packer was released three years later 
and vigorously campaigned against laws that allowed people to be committed 
based solely on their opinions. The Illinois legislature subsequently enacted a 
statute that required a jury trial before a person can be committed to a mental 
institution. See also Brakel et el., supra note 12, at 15. 
21. Slobogin et al., supra note 15, at 806. 
22. Id. 
23. For a general overview of the state’s parens patriae authority as a basis for 
civil commitment, see Bruce J. Winick, Civil Commitment: A Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence Model 66–68 (2005). 
24. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1978) (holding that “[t]he state 
has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care 
to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for 
themselves”). 
25. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905). For a general overview 
of the state’s police power as a basis for civil commitment, see Winick, supra 
note 23, at 59–66. 
26. Eric S. Janus, Toward a Conceptual Framework for Assessing Police Power 
Commitment Legislation: A Critique of Schopp’s and Winick’s Explications 
of Legal Mental Illness, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 2–4 (1997). 
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Notwithstanding the development of controlling legal standards, it 
was fairly simple to hospitalize a person against her will throughout the 
first half of the twentieth century: one simply had to establish the pre-
sence of mental illness and provide a physician’s recommendation that 
treatment at a psychiatric hospital was necessary.27 Inpatient treatment 
was considered beneficial and there were few procedural barriers to 
admission.28 Because commitment statutes were overwhelmingly based 
on the states parens patriae authority, and because the government was 
ostensibly meeting its obligation to provide patients with necessary 
treatment during commitment, few were concerned with the coercive 
nature of requiring patients to comply with the prescribed treatment.29 
Beginning in the 1950s, however, the country began experiencing 
another shift in its treatment of the mentally ill, this time away from 
the more paternalistic parens patriae approach and towards a liber-
tarian approach—one where the state began to intervene less, commit-
ment requirements became stricter, and mental hospitals began to rap-
idly diminish. This period of deinstitutionalization can be traced to a 
number of factors, including a series of exposés about the treatment of 
the mentally ill in state-run institutions,30 and the concurrent efforts of 
civil rights lawyers and mental health professionals who pushed for 
mental health care reform.31 At the same time, advances in modern 
psychiatric treatment and pharmacology contributed to the change. 
Chlorpromazine, or Thorazine, first became available in 1954 and was 
the first antipsychotic medication that controlled the symptoms of schi-
zophrenia for some patients, thus allowing them to live outside the con-
straints of a psychiatric facility.32 Mental health professionals began to  
27. Winick, supra note 23, at 4. 
28. Testa & West, supra note 7, at 32. 
29. Id. 
30. See, e.g., Mike Gorman, Misery Rules in State Shadowland, The Daily 
Oklahoman 3 (1946), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/ 
TGBBGW.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZNK9-7YCY] (describing “the frightful 
squalor these unfortunates live in—beds jammed against one another, holes 
in the floor, gaping cracks in the wall, long rows of hard, unpainted benches, 
dirty toilets, dining halls where the food is slopped out by unkempt patient 
attendants and, above all, the terrifying atmosphere of hopelessness in insti-
tutions where thousands of patients are penned in day after day and night 
after night endlessly staring at blank walls”); Albert Deutsch, The Shame 
of the States 42 (1948) (describing mental hospitals as “buildings swarming 
with naked humans herded like cattle and treated with less concern, pervaded 
by a fetid odor so heavy, so nauseating, that the stench seemed to have almost 
a physical existence of its own”). 
31. Torrey, supra note 4, at 3–5. 
32. E. Fuller Torrey et al., The Shortage of Public Hospital Beds 
for Mentally Ill Persons: A Report of the Treatment Advocacy 
Center 3 (2008); Testa & West, supra note 7, at 33. 
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see psychotic patients as more manageable, and also more able to man-
age their own lives outside of institutions.33 
At the same time, deinstitutionalization became judicially sanction-
ed when federal and state courts began changing standards for commit-
ments.34 Civil commitment laws were rewritten to provide greater pro-
tections to the mentally ill, and included provisions meant to protect 
the right to liberty of patients. Among these protections were the pat-
ient’s right to a trial with an attorney present and increased oversight 
by courts throughout the duration of confinement.35 Patients were also 
given rights to litigate before and after admission and to refuse treat-
ment. The process effectively shifted from one overseen and administer-
ed by physicians to a more adversarial process subject to judicial review. 
States also began to adopt stricter civil commitment standards, 
shifting away from the traditional need for treatment model to narrower 
“dangerousness to self or others” standards. Unlike traditional commit-
ment standards, which relied on states’ parens patriae authority, this 
heightened standard was an exercise further justified by the state’s pol-
ice power. Because the state has an interest in protecting citizens from 
the dangerous acts of people with mental illness, many states amended 
civil commitment statutes to allow for commitment only when the men-
tally ill person was found to pose a danger to themselves or others.36 
This standard continues to invoke the state’s parens patriae authority 
to protect an individual who is dangerous to herself, but also uses the 
police power to protect communities from individuals who are danger-
ous to others. 
Another related and significant explanation for the shift towards 
the closing of psychiatric facilities and the movement of the mentally 
ill into communities is the creation in the 1960s of federal programs and 
federal funding of the treatment of the mentally ill. For instance, in 
 
33. Lisa Davis et al., Deinstitutionalization? Where Have All the People Gone?, 
14 Current Psychiatry Rep. 259, 260 (2012). 
34. Gerald N. Grob, The Paradox of Deinstitutionalization, Soc’y 51, 53 (July/ 
August 1995). As Grob notes,  
 [t]he traditional preoccupation with professional needs was supple-
mented by a new concern with patient rights. Courts defined a right 
to treatment in a least-restrictive environment, shorted the duration 
of all forms of commitment and placed restraints on its application, 
undermined the sole right of psychiatrists to make purely medical judg-
ments about the necessity of commitment, accepted the right of 
patients to litigate both before and after admission to a mental 
institution, and even defined a right of a patient to refuse treatment 
under certain circumstances. 
  Id.  
35. Testa & West, supra note 7, at 32. 
36. Winick, supra note 23, at 58–59. 
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1963 Congress passed the Community Mental Health Act,37 providing 
funding for the creation of community-based outpatient treatment cen-
ters. The Act was meant to move treatment of individuals out of isolat-
ed hospitals and into the community, where they would have access to 
support groups and employment opportunities.38 In 1965, Medicare and 
Medicaid were introduced, which provided federal funds to states for 
the treatment of mentally ill individuals, but only if those individuals 
lived in the community.39 
These federal programs, therefore, created an incentive for states, 
which had traditionally financed mental hospitals with state funds, to 
discharge patients into the community and defer the cost of treatment 
to the federal government.40 Outpatient treatment was expanded and 
states began moving mentally ill patients out of state hospitals and into 
federally subsidized facilities like nursing homes and group homes.41 
Other social welfare programs were also becoming more common during 
this time, including Social Security Income (SSI) and Social Security 
Disability Income (SSDI), which allowed people with mental illness who 
were living in the community to receive benefits from the federal gov-
ernment for housing and food stamps.42 
While states may have originally been financially incentivized to 
shift the care of people with mental illness into communities, federal 
funding of community-based mental health services was significantly 
curtailed with the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1981.43 This act consolidated federal funding and shifted treatment 
costs for the mentally ill back to individual states, and provided a single 
block grant that allowed each state to administer its funds to mentally 
ill individuals.44 Appropriations for the block grant were significantly 
 
37. Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282. 
38. Slobogin et al., supra note 15, at 810. 
39. Davis et al., supra note 33, at 260. 
40. Torrey et al., supra note 32, at 3 (2008); see also Robert A. Brooks, 
Psychiatrists’ Opinions About Involuntary Civil Commitment: Results of a 
National Survey, 35 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 219, 219 (2007) (noting 
that, following California’s lead from the 1960s, states increasingly “tighten[ed] 
criteria for civil commitment”); Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Mandatory 
Outpatient Treatment Resource 2 (1999). For an excellent description 
of the development of the role of Medicaid, Medicare and SSI in the coverage 
of mental health care, see Frank & Glied, supra note 9, at 93–96. 
41. Davis et al., supra note 33, at 260. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. See also Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, Important Events in Mental 
Health History, http://www.nih.gov/about-nih/what-we-do/nih-almanac/ 
national-institute-mental-health-nimh [https://perma.cc/YV7E-DPGS] 
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lower than previous federal expenditures on community-based mental 
health programs, and the mental health system also had to compete 
with other governmental programs to receive its share of the funds.45 
As a result, state mental health spending has declined; Medicaid is now 
the largest funder of mental health services in the United States and 
contributes more money to mental health than any other public or pri-
vate provider.46 But this decentralization of services and entitlements is 
largely uncoordinated; “[t]he resources flow from a dizzying range of 
federal, state, and private organizations.”47 
These shifts in state approaches to treatment of the mentally ill 
have benefited many people with mental illness. Institutions in the mid-
dle of the twentieth century were often used to warehouse the mentally 
ill; many people lived in hospitals for most or all of their lives without 
receiving care. But, as discussed in the next Part, for people with serious 
mental illness who are not dangerous to either themselves or other peo-
ple, but who are nevertheless unable to provide for their basic needs in 
the community, heightened standards for civil commitment have meant 
that not all individuals with serious mental illness living in their comm-
unities are receiving appropriate mental health care and services. 
II. Current Trends in Civil Commitment 
A. Danger to Self or Others 
Civil commitment laws in the United States are primarily the res-
ponsibility of individual states.48 And while commitment statutes vary 
tremendously among states, every state first requires a finding that the 
person subject to commitment is mentally ill, and that as a result of 
that mental illness, the person meets one or more of the additional 
grounds for commitment.49 Historically, the additional ground needed 
 
(last updated Feb. 19, 2016) (depicting critical events in mental health 
treatment history).  
45. Frank & Glied, supra note 9, at 60–61. 
46. Cynthia Shirk, Medicaid and Mental Health Services, 66 Nat’l Health 
Pol’y F. 3 (2008) (“In 2003, Medicaid spent over $26 billion on mental health 
services—about 26 percent of total national mental health expenditures.”). 
47. Frank & Glied, supra note 9, at 5. 
48. Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment—The American 
Experience, 43 Isr. J. Psychiatry & Related Sci. 209, 211 (2006). 
49. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-52-10.4 (2016) (“(a) A respondent may be committ-
ed to inpatient treatment if the probate court finds, based upon clear and 
convincing evidence that: (i) the respondent is mentally ill; (ii) as a result of 
the mental illness the respondent poses a real and present threat of substantial 
harm to self and/or others; (iii) the respondent will, if not treated, continue 
to suffer mental distress and will continue to experience deterioration of the 
ability to function independently; and (iv) the respondent is unable to make 
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for commitment was a simple finding of “need for treatment.”50 The 
need for treatment model was justified by the states’ parens patriae 
authority and allowed the government to substitute its decision-making 
for that of an incompetent individual.51 But beginning in the 1950s, 
states began to modify civil commitment standards, shifting away from 
the traditional need for treatment models to narrower “dangerousness 
to self or others” standards. The state’s interest in protecting citizens 
from the dangerous acts of others is a fundamental part of its police 
power, and forms the basis for civil commitments based upon a finding 
of dangerousness to others.52 In 1964, the District of Columbia adopted 
the first civil commitment statute with dangerousness as the only allow-
able grounds for commitment,53 and in 1967 California adopted the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, allowing for civil commitment only when 
a person was an imminent danger to themselves or others, or was so 
“gravely disabled” that he would be unable to meet his basic needs for 
survival.54 Other states began adopting stricter dangerousness stand-
ards and rejecting previous “need for treatment” standards as vague 
and unconstitutional.55 
Every state now allows that an individual may be committed upon 
a finding that she poses a danger to herself or others.56 There are signif-
icant differences among states, however, as to the definition of danger 
 
a rational and informed decision as to whether or not treatment for mental 
illness would be desirable.”). Most states also require that a decision in civil 
commitment adjudications represent the “least restrictive alternative.” John 
Parry, Civil Mental Disability Law, Evidence and Testimony 475 
(2010) (“Often, this requirement affects if, where, and under what conditions 
commitment will take place, and not whether a person meets the commitment 
standards.”). 
50. See supra text accompanying notes 18–20. 
51. Winick, supra note 23, at 66. 
52. Id. at 59. 
53. Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 48, at 211. 
54. Carol A.B. Warren, Involuntary Commitment for Mental Disorder: The 
Application of California’s Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 11 L. & Soc’y 
Rev. 629, 630 (1977). 
55. Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 48, at 211. 
56. Testa & West, supra note 7, at 33. Although Testa and West note that a 
minority of states, including Delaware and Iowa, did not allow for a commit-
ment upon a finding of danger to self or others, both states have since updated 
their laws. Id. Delaware amended its statute in 2014 to allow for commitment 
when, “[b]ased upon manifest indications, the individual is: a. dangerous to 
self; or b. dangerous to others.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 5011(a) (2014). 
Similarly, in 2013, Iowa amended its statute to allow for a commitment of a 
“person who presents a danger to self or others and lacks judgmental capacity 
due to . . . serious mental impairment.” Iowa Code Ann. § 229.6(2) (West 
2016). A person with a “serious mental impairment” is one who “[i]s likely to 
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to self or others. Dangerousness is usually interpreted to mean physical 
harm to self, including attempted suicide, or to others, including overt 
acts and threats of violence.57 At one time, most states required evid-
ence of recent and overt threats or actions to establish that the individ-
ual posed a danger to others,58 but many states now allow predictions 
of future dangerousness to be established based on recent behavior.59 
Some states require that the danger be imminent, or likely to occur 
immediately or in the near future,60 while others have eliminated the 
imminence requirement, as long as the danger is substantial.61 Other 
 
physically injure the person’s self or others if allowed to remain at liberty 
without treatment.” Iowa Code Ann. § 229.1(20) (West 2016). Neither 
statute allows for commitment upon a finding of grave disability. 
57. Parry, supra note 49, at 476. 
58. Id. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 433A.115(3) (2013) (“A person presents a clear 
and present danger of harm to others if, within the immediately preceding 30 
days, the person has, as a result of a mental illness, inflicted or attempted to 
inflict serious bodily harm on any other person, or made threats to inflict 
harm and committed acts in furtherance of those threats, and if there exists 
a reasonable probability that he or she will do so again unless the person is 
admitted to a mental health facility . . . and adequate treatment is provided 
to him or her.”). 
59. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 27A-1-1(6) (2013) (“‘Danger to others,’ a 
reasonable expectation that the person will inflict serious physical injury 
upon another person in the near future, due to a severe mental illness, as 
evidenced by the person’s treatment history and the person’s recent acts or 
omissions which constitute a danger of serious physical injury for another 
individual.”). 
60. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 37-3-1(9.1)(A)(i) (2012) (“‘Inpatient’ means a 
person who is mentally ill and . . . [w]ho presents a substantial risk of 
imminent harm to that person or others, as manifested by either recent 
overt acts or recent expressed threats of violence which present a probability 
of physical injury to that person or other persons.”). 
61. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 62A-15-631(10)(b) (LexisNexis 2015) (“[B]e-
cause of the proposed patient’s mental illness the proposed patient poses a 
substantial danger . . . .”). See also Robert I. Simon, The Myth of “Imminent” 
Violence in Psychiatry and the Law, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 631, 632 (2006) 
(discussing the somewhat arbitrary timeframes clinicians use to determine 
“imminence”). In assessing imminent dangerousness to others, Simon notes 
that clinicians have used standards ranging from “[seven] days following 
assessment,” to “the near future (i.e., days or a week or so).” Id. at 633. And 
while he observes that “[t]hese time limits seemed to be pulled out of thin 
air,” he concedes that “in prediction research it is appropriate to use the 
term ‘imminent,’ so long as the time frame is specified . . . .” Id. at 634. In 
assessing imminent dangerousness to others, Simon notes that “[c]linicians 
ascribe arbitrary time limits for ‘imminent’ suicide, although most time frames 
are vague, usually given as a range such as 12–24 hours, 24–48 hours, 1–3 
weeks, 1 month or 1 year.” Id. at 632. 
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statutes do not define dangerousness or include a timeframe, but simply 
require that the person pose a threat of harm to herself or others.62 
In O’Connor v. Donaldson,63 the only Supreme Court case to speak 
directly to civil commitment criteria, the Court held that Kenneth 
Donaldson—a Florida man who had been held for fifteen years in a 
state hospital with no treatment—could not be held “without more” if 
he were not dangerous and “capable of surviving safely in freedom by 
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or 
friends.”64 The Court’s use of the term “without more” has caused some 
to question whether the absence of treatment or the dangerousness cri-
terion was more critical to the Court’s analysis.65 In other words, the 
opinion could be read to mean “if treatment is provided or if the patient 
is dangerous, commitment can continue.”66 Nevertheless, most courts 
have interpreted the case to endorse the dangerousness standard in civil 
commitment cases.67 
 
62. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-52-10.4(a)(ii) (2016) (“[A]s a result of the mental 
illness the respondent poses a real and present threat of substantial harm 
to self and/or others . . . .”). 
63. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
64. Id. at 576. 
65. As Anfang and Appelbaum note, “the Court’s comments . . . were so 
ambiguous that they could be interpreted to support either position.” 
Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 48, at 211. 
66. Id. Interestingly, in a later case finding that patients must be mentally 
competent to sign consent forms for a voluntary inpatient commitment, the 
Court cited a different portion of the O’Connor decision, which seems to 
endorse the dangerousness standard Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 134 
(1989) (citing O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575) (“[T]here is no constitutional basis 
for confining mentally ill persons involuntarily ‘if they are dangerous to no 
one and can live safely in freedom’”). The Court did not cite the portion of 
the prior opinion that referred to “without more.” Compare O’Connor, 422 
U.S. at 575, with Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 134. 
67. The Court also defined the burden of proof for a civil commitment in 
Addington v. Texas, where it rejected the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt stan-
dard and established the clear-and-convincing standard as providing the 
minimum procedural threshold for issuing an involuntary commitment order. 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979) (“We have concluded that 
the reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate in civil commitment 
proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may 
impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable 
barrier to needed medical treatment. . . . To meet due process demands, the 
standard has to inform the factfinder that the proof must be greater than 
the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable to other categories of 
civil cases.”); see also Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 
68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 253 (2011) (arguing that the clear-and-convincing 
standard did not adequately protect patients’ due process rights); Parry, 
supra note 49, at 483 (“Forty-seven jurisdictions have statutory language 
that requires clear and convincing evidence or something that includes that 
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As states began adopting statutes that required a finding of danger-
ousness as grounds for commitment, this necessitated a means of assess-
ing future dangerousness. As one author put it, the need for a reliable 
method of predicting future dangerousness 
did not arise as a result of clinical experience or wisdom, or of 
empirical evidence, or even of the quest for testable hypotheses 
about human behavior and its antecedents. It arose out of prag-
matic needs for criteria to make distinctions between patients 
appropriate for inpatient or outpatient treatment, or for volun-
tary or involuntary treatment, when those became real choices in 
the 1960s and 1970s.68 
Predicting the likelihood of future dangerousness required by civil 
commitment statutes, however, is a difficult task and has long posed 
unique challenges to clinicians. Early studies examining the accuracy of 
future risk assessment found that “clinicians had little expertise in 
predicting violent outcomes.”69 These critiques of clinical predictions of 
violence based on informal impressions and individual judgment led to 
the development of standardized psychological tests—actuarial risk 
assessment instruments—that help clinicians evaluate the likelihood 
that an individual will become violent.70 And while these instruments 
have improved clinicians’ ability to forecast future violence, they are 
not foolproof and many consider the field of risk assessment to continue 
to be largely unreliable.71  
standard plus something a little more, such as ‘clear, cogent, and convincing’ 
in North Carolina, Washington, and West Virginia.”). 
68. Michael A. Norko & Madelon V. Baranoski, The Prediction of Violence; 
Detection of Dangerousness, 8 Brief Treatment & Crisis Intervention 
73, 73 (2008). 
69. See Mairead Dolan & Michael Doyle, Violence Risk Prediction, 177 Brit. 
J. of Psychiatry 303, 303 (2000) (citing various studies); see also Stephen 
D. Hart et al., Precision of Actuarial Risk Assessment Instruments, 190 
Brit. J. of Psychiatry (Supp. 49) s60, s60 (2007) (“Research indicates 
that predictions of violence made using unaided (i.e., informal, impressionistic 
or intuitive) judgement are seriously limited with respect to both inter-
clinician agreement and accuracy.”). 
70. Jennifer L. Skeem & John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk 
Assessment, 20 Current Directions in Psychol. Sci. 38, 38 (2011); 
see also Hart et al., supra note 69, at s60 (discussing the development and 
use of actuarial risk assessment instruments (ARAIs)). Some states even 
require that specific risk assessment tools be used when assessing likelihood 
of future risk. Skeem & Monahan, supra, at 38 (noting that “Virginia’s 
Sexually Violent Predator statute not only mandates the use of a specific 
instrument but also specifies the cutoff score on that instrument that must 
be achieved to proceed further in the commitment process”). 
71. See, e.g., Norko & Baranoski, supra note 68, at 79–80 (noting that “[d]espite 
clear progress in the empirical understanding of the correlates of violence, 
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Furthermore, even with improved assessment techniques, danger-
ousness is a concept that is difficult to define and subject to individual 
interpretation. One study found that some psychiatrists interpreted a 
dangerousness standard to require that a patient pose an immediate, 
clear, or imminent danger to self or others, while others thought the 
statute required that the patient’s condition present a probable, poss-
ible, or potential danger.72 Others thought emergency hospitalization 
was permitted only for homicidal or suicidal patients, while some belie-
ved commitment was permissible when a patient exhibited self-destruc-
tive impulses.73 Because many state statutes do not define “danger,” 
the statutes themselves put the burden on clinicians to substitute their 
own judgment for what a finding of dangerousness should encompass.74 
Finally, a determination of dangerousness is distinct from most factual 
determinations because it requires clinicians to predict the likelihood of 
an event occurring in the future, as opposed to determining whether a 
particular event has already occurred.75 Without clear statutory guid-
ance on the definition of danger, many psychiatrists are necessarily for-
ced to use “discretion to rule in a manner consistent with his or her 
value system, as opposed to applying fact and law in a neutral man-
ner.”76 
B. Grave Disability 
A finding of danger to self or others has therefore become the pri-
mary grounds for civil commitment since deinstitutionalization, and one 
 
there are substantial limitations of the science, especially in application to 
individual patients or evaluees”); Dolan & Doyle, supra note 69, at 303 
(“Violence risk prediction is an inexact science and as such will continue to 
provoke debate.”). 
72. Glenn G. Affleck et al., Psychiatrists’ Familiarity with Legal Statutes 
Governing Emergency Involuntary Hospitalization, 135 Am. J. Psychiatry 
205, 208 (1978). 
73. Id.  
74. William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags The Dog: The Pervasive And 
Inappropriate Influence By The Psychiatric Profession On The Civil 
Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. Rev. 259, 293 (2010) [hereinafter 
Brooks]. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 334-1 (West 2008) (“‘Danger-
ous to others’ means likely to do substantial physical or emotional injury 
on another, as evidenced by a recent act, attempt or threat . . . ‘Dangerous 
to self’ means the person recently has: (1) Threatened or attempted suicide 
or serious bodily harm; or (2) Behaved in such a manner as to indicate that 
the person is unable, without supervision and the assistance of others, to satisfy 
the need for nourishment, essential medical care, shelter or self-protection, 
so that it is probable that death, substantial bodily injury, or serious physical 
debilitation or disease will result unless adequate treatment is afforded.”). 
75. Brooks, supra note 74, at 294. 
76. Id. at 295. 
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that is justified under the state’s police power and its parens patriae 
authority. More recently, however, many states have begun to recognize 
the value of commitment for individuals who are seriously mentally ill 
but not dangerous to themselves or others.77 These additional grounds 
for commitment, including grave disability, are premised solely on stat-
es’ parens patriae authority, in that the state is substituting its judg-
ment for that of the mentally ill person and providing treatment that 
the individual might have chosen for herself had she been competent.78 
For the state to commit an individual using its parens patriae author-
ity, hospitalization must be more than beneficial to the person; it must 
also be necessary because the person’s ability to make decisions for 
herself is so impaired that she is unable to understand that treatment 
is in her own best interest.79 
In the 1970s, states began including grounds for commitment based 
on “grave disability.” Although grave disability can implicate states’ 
police power when based upon a finding that the individual is dangerous 
to herself, it can also implicate the parens patriae authority when based 
upon a finding that the individual is unable to provide for her basic 
needs as a result of mental illness.80 Although almost every state has a  
77. Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 48, at 212. 
78. Winick, supra note 23, at 66. Some states have allowed for even greater 
expansion of the parens patriae authority in civil commitments by again 
including explicit “need for treatment” standards in commitment statutes. 
See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 334-60.2 (“A person may be committed 
to a psychiatric facility for involuntary hospitalization, if the court finds: 
(1) That the person is mentally ill or suffering from substance abuse; (2) 
That the person is imminently dangerous to self or others; and (3) That 
the person is in need of care or treatment, or both, and there is no suitable 
alternative available through existing facilities and programs which would 
be less restrictive than hospitalization.”). 
79. Winick, supra note 23, at 42–43. 
80. Parry, supra note 49, at 478. At least forty-two states now incorporate 
a gravely disabled standard into civil commitment statutes. These include 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. See Treatment Advocacy Center, State Standards for 
Assisted Treatment: Civil Commitment Criteria for Inpatient or 
Outpatient Psychiatric Treatment (2014). A few states do not follow 
this trend. For example, Delaware allows for civil commitment when the 
person is unable to make reasonable decisions about hospitalization. Del 
Code Ann. tit. 16, § 5005(a) (Supp. 2014). Other states expand standards 
for gravely disabled. Iowa, for example, allows for commitment if the person 
has a mental illness and “[i]s likely to inflict serious emotional injury on 
members of the person’s family or others who lack reasonable opportunity 
to avoid contact with the person with mental illness if the person with mental 
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ground for commitment based on an individual’s inability to provide 
for her own basic needs, many state statutes do not clearly distinguish 
between grave disability based on dangerousness to self, and grave dis-
ability based on an inability to provide for basic needs like food, cloth-
ing, shelter, and medical care.81 When grave disability is based on an 
inability to provide for one’s basic needs, most states require that the 
resultant harm be “serious.”82 Other states simply require that as a 
result of mental illness, the person is unable to provide for basic needs.83 
 
illness is allowed to remain at liberty without treatment.” Iowa Code 
§ 229.1(17)(b) (West 2016). 
81. Parry, supra note 49, at 478 (“The requirement that proposed patients be 
unable to provide for their basic needs is found both as an independent 
criterion and also as part of the grave disability provisions. Like grave 
disability, the most common formulation is one in which the inability to care 
for oneself causes substantial personal harm.”). Some states also include the 
inability to make rational decisions within gravely disabled grounds for 
commitment. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 27-65-102(9) (2015) (“‘Gravely 
disabled’ means a condition in which a person, as a result of a mental health 
disorder, is incapable of making informed decisions about or providing for 
his or her essential needs without significant supervision and assistance 
from other people.”); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-495 (2016) (“‘[G]ravely dis-
abled’ means that a person, as a result of mental or emotional impairment, 
is in danger of serious harm as a result of an inability or failure to provide for 
his or her own basic human needs such as essential food, clothing, shelter 
or safety and that hospital treatment is necessary and available and that such 
person is mentally incapable of determining whether or not to accept such 
treatment because his judgment is impaired by his psychiatric disabilities.”). 
82. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 71.05.020 (“Gravely disabled’ means a con-
dition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder: (a) Is in danger of 
serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential 
human needs of health or safety.”). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 27-65-102(9) (2015) 
(“‘Gravely disabled’ means a condition in which a person, as a result of a 
mental health disorder, is incapable of making informed decisions about or 
providing for his or her essential needs without significant supervision and 
assistance from other people. As a result of being incapable of making these 
informed decisions, a person who is gravely disabled is at risk of substantial 
bodily harm, dangerous worsening of any concomitant serious physical illness, 
significant psychiatric deterioration, or mismanagement of his or her essential 
needs that could result in substantial bodily harm.”). 
83. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 426.005(1)(f) (2015) (“‘Person with a mental 
illness’ means a person who, because of a mental disorder, is . . . [u]nable to 
provide for basic personal needs that are necessary to avoid serious physical 
harm in the near future, and is not receiving such care as is necessary to 
avoid such harm.”); Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5008(h)(1)(A) (West Supp. 
2016) (“‘[G]ravely disabled’ means . . . [a] condition in which a person, as a 
result of a mental health disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic 
personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter.”). 
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A minority of states explicitly tie a finding of grave disability to imm-
inent danger.84 
Many states have civil commitment statutes that allow for commit-
ment on grounds of both danger to self and grave disability. Arizona’s 
statute, for example provides the following: 
“Danger to self” (a) means behavior that, as a result of a mental 
disorder: (i) Constitutes a danger of inflicting serious physical 
harm on oneself, including attempted suicide or the serious threat 
thereof, if the threat is such that, when considered in the light of 
its context and in light of the individual's previous acts, it is sub-
stantially supportive of an expectation that the threat will be 
carried out (ii) Without hospitalization will result in serious phy-
sical harm or serious illness to the person (b) Does not include 
behavior that establishes only the condition of persons with grave 
disabilities. 
“Persons with grave disabilities” means a condition evidenced by 
behavior in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is 
likely to come to serious physical harm or serious illness because 
the person is unable to provide for the person's own basic physical 
needs.85 
Some states have tried to make their parens patriae authority more 
explicit in gravely disabled commitment grounds by adding “deterior-
ation” language to their civil commitment statutes, which allow for co-
mmitment when a person is not in imminent harm due grave disability, 
but is likely to become so in the near future without further treatment.86 
These broadened commitment standards are intended to provide treat-
ment to people with serious mental illness, and also reduce the numbers 
of people with serious mental illness who become homeless or are incar-
cerated.87 For example, Idaho defines gravely disabled to include an 
individual who, without treatment is substantially likely to “physically,  
84. Ga. Code Ann. § 37-3-1(9.1) (2012) (allowing for inpatient commitment of 
a person “[w]ho is so unable to care for that person’s own physical health 
and safety as to create an imminently life-endangering crisis”). 
85. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-501. 
86. John Kip Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and Parens 
Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 
4 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y, & L. 377, 385 (1998). See also Miss. Code Ann. 
§ 41-21-61(e) (2016) (defining “person with mental illness” as “a person who, 
based on treatment history and other applicable psychiatric indicia, is in need 
of treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration which 
would predictably result in dangerousness to himself or others when his current 
mental illness limits or negates his ability to make an informed decision to 
seek or comply with recommended treatment”). 
87. Cornwell, supra note 86, at 385–86. 
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emotionally or mentally deteriorate to the point that the person will, 
in the reasonably near future, be in danger of serious physical harm due 
to the person’s inability to provide for any of his own basic personal 
needs such as nourishment, essential clothing, medical care, shelter or 
safety.”88 Under these standards, the parens patriae authority explicitly 
allows for commitment before an individual is dangerous to herself. 
Notwithstanding available parens patriae grounds for civil commit-
ment, including grave disability, many courts and psychiatrists contin-
ue to read a dangerousness requirement into parens patriae grounds for 
commitment.89 After the predicate finding of mental illness, “dangerous 
to self or others” is the most commonly used grounds for civil commit-
ment orders.90 And as discussed in the next Part, in civil commitment 
proceedings, “dangerousness determinations predominate whichever 
standard is used.”91 
III. The Role of Psychiatrists and Courts in  
Civil Commitment Proceedings 
In the United States, mental health professionals typically testify 
in civil commitment hearings, and courts rely heavily on that testimony 
when deciding if an individual meets the state’s standards for civil com-
mitment.92 Psychiatrists are “perceived as holding the most power in 
the commitment process—in fact, some observers see courts as ‘rubber 
stamps’ of psychiatrists’ testimony.”93 Studies suggest that there is a 
high correlation between psychiatrist’s recommendations and judges’ 
 
88. Idaho Code Ann. § 66-317(13) (West 2016). 
89. See infra text accompanying notes 158–170. 
90. Parry, supra note 49, at 476. 
91. Id. at 474. 
92. Brooks, supra note 40, at 219 (“Psychiatrists make decisions on admissions 
and discharges, and also frequently provide expert testimony in civil commit-
ment cases.”). See also Winick, supra note 23, at 63 (noting that “[c]ivil 
commitment courts typically rely upon the testimony of clinical expert 
witnesses who have evaluated the individual and who present their clinical 
conclusions concerning the degree of risk he or she is thought to present”); 
Grant H. Morris, “Let’s Do the Time Warp Again”: Assessing the Competence 
of Counsel in Mental Health Conservatorship Proceedings, 46 San Diego 
L. Rev. 283, 314–15 (2009) (“[D]espite the fallibility of psychiatric testimony, 
judges and juries, serving as fact finders in civil commitment and conserv-
atorship proceedings, typically defer to psychiatric judgments that the person 
has a mental disorder and that the mental disorder meets the statutory 
standard for commitment or a conservatorship.”). 
93. Brooks, supra note 74, at 285 (“When judges defer to psychiatrists at a 
rate between 90 and 100 percent of the time the psychiatrist experts actually 
become the decision-makers in the civil commitment process.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 3·2016 
The Danger Zone 
678 
decisions in civil commitment proceedings, often as high as 90%.94 Most 
judges have little training in mental health law or psychiatric diagnosis, 
so this deference to psychiatric forensic testimony in civil commitment 
proceedings is not surprising.95 Furthermore, civil commitment proceed-
ings may not be given priority by judges with busy caseloads, who may 
therefore lack an incentive to carefully scrutinize psychiatrists’ recomm-
endations.96 Civil commitment proceedings tend to be short and perfun-
ctory; as one author put it, “It seems safe to conclude that civil commit-
ment is a disfavored stepchild in the large family of concerns that must 
be addressed by the justice system.”97 
Like judges, lawyers are also deferential to psychiatrists in commit-
ment adjudications. One study of North Carolina lawyers found that 
lawyers felt conflicted by their dual roles in commitment proceedings.98 
They viewed mental illness and treatment as medical problems, and 
tended to defer to psychiatrists’ opinions and recommendations regard-
ing civil commitment.99 At the same time, they felt obligated to advo-
cate for their clients and prevent the client’s loss of freedom that would 
result from commitment.100 Many lawyers in the study noted that “if 
they fought commitment under these circumstances, they could obtain 
release for anyone, even for the dangerously mentally ill; but release of 
the dangerous would be a Pyrrhic victory that would endanger the res-
pondent or society and eliminate the chance for help.”101 Perhaps as a 
result of these conflicting goals, most lawyers prepared much less for 
civil commitment cases than for other cases, many did not speak to 
clients before the hearing, and “rarely took an adversary role to obtain 
release of their clients whom psychiatrists had recommended for comm-
itment.”102 
 
94. Id. 
95. Paul S. Applebaum, Civil Commitment from a Systems Perspective, 16 
L. & Hum. Behav. 61, 66 (1992); see also Brooks, supra note 74, at 286 
(“[J]udges defer to psychiatric opinion because they feel they lack the 
requisite expertise to independently assess whether patients meet the 
statutory criteria for commitment.”). 
96. Applebaum, supra note 95, at 66–67. 
97. Id. at 66. 
98. Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Are Lawyers Enemies of Psychiatrists? A Survey of 
Civil Commitment Counsel and Judges, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 323, 326 
(1983). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. (noting that “they almost never challenged the medical affidavit or argued 
that the respondent was not mentally ill” and that “[o]nly infrequently did 
they argue that the dangerousness criterion was not met”). 
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Civil commitment proceedings necessarily involve the interaction of 
two distinct systems: the mental health system and the justice sys-
tem.103 When testifying in civil commitment proceedings, psychiatrists 
therefore rely on both state commitment statutes and on the criteria in 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Typ-
ically, the DSM is used to diagnose the requisite mental condition, and 
it refers to its use in civil commitment proceedings by noting  
[w]hen used appropriately, diagnoses and diagnostic information 
can assist legal decision makers in their determinations. For ex-
ample, when the presence of a mental disorder is the predicate for 
a subsequent legal determination (e.g., involuntary civil commit-
ment), the use of an established system of diagnosis enhances the 
value and reliability of the determination.104 
In the context of civil commitment statutes, however, the DSM-5 
is not determinative with respect to the outcome of a civil commitment 
proceeding. The finding of a “mental illness” is a predicate to other 
legal determinations, such as whether a person is dangerous or gravely 
disabled. Psychiatrists in commitment proceedings are therefore asked 
to make both clinical and legal determinations, and those legal deter-
minations require knowledge of the relevant statutes and case law. For 
instance, how a psychiatrist believes the law requires her to interpret 
“gravely disabled” can have a large impact on whether a person is found 
to satisfy commitment statutes. 
Several studies of psychiatrists and other clinicians “have documen-
ted a remarkable degree of ignorance of commitment criteria.”105 Specif-
ically, some psychiatrists are not aware of available grounds for civil 
commitment apart from grounds based upon a finding of danger to self 
or others. For instance, one study surveyed 1,500 members of the Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association (APA), including 1,000 APA general mem-
bers and 250 members from each of two APA membership sections 
(Emergency Psychiatry and Suicide/Self-Injury) whose members were 
thought to have had more experience with civil commitment.106 The 
study found many psychiatrists were not accurate when asked about 
grounds for civil commitment in their state. Only 70.7% of respondents 
correctly believed that grave disability was a ground for commitment 
 
103. Applebaum, supra note 95, at 64–66. 
104. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual on 
Mental Disorders 25 (5th ed. 2013). 
105. Applebaum, supra note 95, at 65. 
106. Brooks, supra note 40, at 220. 
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in their state when it was a ground.107 In contrast, 61.5% of respondents 
thought grave disability was a ground when it was not.108 
Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that mental illness and 
dangerousness are so intertwined that psychiatrists and judges are in 
fact unable to separate them.109 This conflation is reflected in the Sup-
reme Court’s decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson110 and in states’ resp-
onses to that decision, namely that the majority of states now have a 
dangerousness criterion in their civil commitment statutes.111 Several 
studies have found that changes in civil commitment standards do not 
affect court practices or rates of commitment.112 This discrepancy be-
tween civil commitment laws and their application has led some authors 
to “conclude that the actors’ socially embedded agency—their perspec-
tives, motivations and interests, as influenced by broader social repre-
sentations—is the most determinant factor in civil commitment decis-
ions.”113 
 
107. Id. at 223. 
108. Id. 
109. E.g., Bernadette Dallaire et al., Civil Commitment Due To Mental Illness 
And Dangerousness: The Union Of Law And Psychiatry Within A Treatment-
Control System, 22 Soc’y of Health & Illness 679, 691 (2000) (noting 
that “the widely shared tendency to equate mental illness with dangerousness 
is manifested in the rationale for, and operationalisation of, civil commitment 
laws”). 
110. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).  
111. Parry, supra note 49, at 476 (noting that “‘dangerous to self or others,’ or 
similar criteria based on harm to self or others, is the most commonly used 
statutory element for extended involuntary inpatient commitment; it is 
incorporated in some manner into the statutes of 36 jurisdictions and is an 
absolute requirement in most of them”). 
112. See, e.g., Jonathan J. Marz & Richard M. Levinson, Statutory Change And 
‘Street-Level’ Implementation Of Psychiatric Commitment, 27 Soc’y Sci. 
& Med. 1247, 1253–54 (1988) (“Thus, rather than being passive objects of 
statutory changes, participants in the mental health system may actively 
adapt to the changes and look for ways to cope within the framework to 
obtain desired outcomes . . . the ambiguity of statutory criteria combined 
with the interests of participants dilute the impact of changes in the law.”); 
Paul S. Appelbaum, Almost A Revolution: An International Perspective On 
The Law Of Involuntary Commitment, 25 J. Am. Acad. of Psychiatry 
& L. 135, 142 (1997) (discussing the “relative lack of impact of commitment 
law changes in the United States”). 
113. Dallaire et al., supra note 109, at 690; see also id. at 689 (“[W]e observed 
that the pertinent legal provisions appeared less as rules uniformly applied 
than as rhetorical instruments where the actual citation of the entire article 
of the law served as sole argument for the law to be applied.”). Of course, it 
is also possible that judges and psychiatrists do not apply standards with 
which they disagree. As one author put it, “laws are enforced by people; they 
do not enforce themselves. Unless a law is generally accepted as being worthy 
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While many states therefore include grave disability as an addit-
ional ground for commitment, courts and psychiatrists often conflate 
the two provisions, perhaps because some state statutes require that 
the grave disability due to an inability to provide for basic needs put 
the individual in danger of serious harm. Yet even in states that require 
serious harm, this requirement of harm should not be interpreted to rise 
to the level of danger or imminent danger to self as required by other 
dangerousness grounds for commitment. A common canon of statutory 
construction provides that if a statute includes a specific provision tar-
geting a particular issue, that provision should apply instead of provis-
ions more generally covering the issue.114 Gravely disabled provisions 
premised on an inability to provide for one’s basic needs are included 
in almost every state civil commitment statute. This ground for comm-
itment is included as an additional ground to provisions that allow for 
commitment when a person poses a danger to herself. For that reason, 
gravely disabled grounds that require a person’s inability to meet her 
basic needs to require serious harm should not also be read to require a 
heightened finding of danger to self. 
Moreover, the legislative intent of the gravely disabled standard 
seems to have been to broaden commitment statutes to allow for comm-
itment before an individual was found to be dangerous. The Alaska 
Supreme Court, for example, in reviewing the legislative history of 
Alaska’s addition of gravely disabled to its statutes in 1984, noted that 
the law before the amendment only allowed the state “to hold people 
with violent tendencies and the addition of the ‘gravely disabled’ lang-
uage would allow [the state psychiatric facility] ‘to hold people that 
need to [be held], but haven’t shown a violent tendency.’”115 The intent 
of the gravely disabled grounds for commitment was to allow “a person 
[to] be committed before it’s too late.”116 Similarly, proponents of a bill 
to include a separate ground of “gravely disabled” in Hawaii statutes 
governing emergency commitment noted that  
the courts have been reluctant to enforce Hawaii’s civil commit-
ment laws absent a finding that the individual is imminently dan-
gerous, thereby forcing the individual to live on the streets or left 
in the care of family and friends who must watch the individuals 
 
of respect, it will be widely ignored.” Paul S. Applebaum, Almost a 
Revolution: Mental Health Law and the Limits of Change 41 (1994). 
114. E.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989) (stating 
that “[a] general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is no 
more specific rule”). 
115. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 377 (Alaska 2007). 
116. Id. 
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decompensate to the point of becoming dangerous to themselves 
or others before obtaining treatment.117 
Yet despite the availability of a finding of grave disability due to a 
person’s inability to meet her basic needs, dangerousness determin-
ations predominate commitment adjudications and many courts inter-
pret “gravely disabled” to mean that a person is unable to care for her 
own basic needs and therefore poses an imminent danger to herself.118 
For example, in In re M.M.,119 a Louisiana court found that an indivi-
dual was not gravely disabled because the hospital  
did not prove clearly and convincingly that she is unable to pro-
vide for her own basic physical needs as a result of her illness and 
that she is unable to survive safely in freedom or protect herself 
from serious harm, the statutory requirements for a finding that 
she was gravely disabled. There is no evidence in the record indi-
cating that she was dangerous to herself or dangerous to others.120 
The Louisiana statute defines “grave disability” as “the condition 
of a person who is unable to provide for his own basic physical needs, 
such as essential food, clothing, medical care, and shelter, as a result of 
serious mental illness or substance abuse and is unable to survive safely 
in freedom or protect himself from serious harm.”121 Louisiana’s code 
has a separate provision that defines “[d]angerous to self” as “the con-
dition of a person whose behavior, significant threats or inaction supp-
orts a reasonable expectation that there is a substantial risk that he 
will inflict physical or severe emotional harm upon his own person.”122 
Louisiana’s definition of grave disability does not require a finding of 
“danger to self,” only that the person cannot survive safely in freedom. 
Moreover, the inclusion of a separate definition of “danger to self,” 
which does encompass situations where an individual is likely to inflict 
physical harm on herself, suggests that the legislature intended to create 
a gravely disabled grounds for commitment that was broader than the 
strict “danger to self” grounds, namely one that allowed for the commit-
ment of an individual when she cannot “survive safely in freedom” but 
does not necessarily pose a danger to herself. Notwithstanding this add-
itional ground for commitment, the Louisiana court seems to have inter-
 
117. S. 16-2650, Reg. Sess., at 1180 (Haw. 1992). 
118. Parry, supra note 49, at 474. 
119. 552 So. 2d 528 (La. Ct. App. 1989). 
120. Id. at 530. 
121. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28:2(10) (2015). 
122. Id. at § 28:2(4). 
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preted the gravely disabled requirement of serious harm to mean imm-
inent danger to self, thus conflating the two separate commitment 
grounds. 
Similarly, in In re C.K.,123 a Washington court found that C.K. was 
gravely disabled because he refused to take medication and if he were 
not ordered to take his medication, there would be a “very high prob-
ability that his behavior will once again become dangerous to himself 
and others.”124 Yet the Washington statute governing civil commitment 
defines “gravely disabled” as “a condition in which a person, as a result 
of a mental disorder is . . . in danger of serious physical harm resulting 
from a failure to provide for his or her essential human needs of health 
or safety.”125 Like Louisiana, the Washington statute distinguishes 
between harm to others and harm to self, and provides that a person 
presents a “likelihood of serious harm” to herself when there is a sub-
stantial risk that “[p]hysical harm will be inflicted by a person upon his 
or her own person, as evidenced by threats or attempts to commit sui-
cide or inflict physical harm on oneself.”126 While the court in this case 
did find that the person satisfied the commitment standard, the lang-
uage of the decision again reflects a misunderstanding of the separate 
grounds for commitment, as well as the likely legislative intent behind 
the inclusion of two separate grounds. 
While some state legislatures have therefore recognized that many 
people with serious mental illness might benefit from civil commitment 
before they have deteriorated to the point that they might pose a dang-
er to themselves or others, the research suggests that some psychiatrists 
and courts have not fully embraced standards other than a dangerous-
ness standard in civil commitment proceedings. And while a heightened 
standard of civil commitment is appropriate and protective of the civil 
liberties of people with mental illness, it has also had unintended effects. 
Many people with serious mental illness are unable to perceive a need 
for treatment, and many of those people also lack the financial resources 
or support systems to help them obtain treatment. For these individ-
uals, a heightened commitment standard coupled with a lack of avail-
able community-based resources has led to a near-complete absence of 
 
123. In re C.K., 29 P.3d 69. 
124. Id. at 75 (finding that “the court below properly considered C.K.’s past 
patterns of behavior, taking into consideration C.K.’s prior decompensation 
when not under treatment and discontinuing his medication, his dangerous 
behavior as a result of his serious mental disorder while not medicated, his 
lack of appreciation for the necessity of taking his medication, his stated in-
tent to discontinue medication unless ordered by the court, and the very high 
probability that his behavior will once again become dangerous to himself 
and others if not under court order to take his medication”).  
125. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.05.020(17) (West 2016). 
126. Id. § 71.05.020(27(a)). 
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mental health care. As explained in the next Part, moreover, the inter-
pretation of commitment standards to require a finding of dangerous-
ness may be further perpetuating perceptions about the link between 
mental illness and violence, and the associated stigma experienced by 
people with untreated mental illness. 
IV. Public Perceptions About Mental Illness  
& Dangerousness 
When civil commitment standards began changing from a need-for-
treatment standard to a dangerousness standard, so too did public per-
ceptions of the dangerousness of people with mental illness. In one 
study, researchers compared perceptions of the link between mental 
illness and dangerousness in 1950 and in 1996. For both time periods, 
respondents were asked: “When you hear someone say that a person is 
‘mentally-ill,’ what does that mean to you?”127 During both time peri-
ods, people who described mental illness as including psychosis were 
more likely to mention violence in their description of mental illness.128 
But the number of people who described mental illness as including 
psychosis and violence more than doubled between 1950 and 1996, from 
12.7% in 1950 to 31% in 1996.129 In other words, people in 1996 were 
more than twice as likely to think of people with mental illness as both 
psychotic and violent than they were in 1950. 
Another recent study examined these attitudes slightly differently. 
Respondents were given descriptions of a man named “John” and asked 
how likely they thought it was that John would be violent towards 
other people.130 In the first scenario, John was described as someone 
who was “troubled,” but otherwise not suffering from any mental ill-
ness.131 In this scenario, John was sometimes a little worried or a little 
sad, but otherwise “getting along pretty well.”132 In response to this 
 
127. Jo Phelan et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness in 1950 and 1996: 
What Is Mental Illness and Is It to be Feared?, 41 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 
188, 191 (2000). 
128. “[T]his association between descriptions of psychosis and mentions of dan-
gerousness increased substantially over the period under study. Among 
respondents who did not mention psychosis in their description of a mentally 
ill person, the percentage who mentioned violence decreased from 3 percent 
in 1950 to 2 percent in 1996.” Id. at 197. 
129. Id. 
130. Bernice A. Pescosolido, The Public’s View of the Competence, Dangerousness, 
and Need for Legal Coercion of Persons With Mental Health Problems, 89 
Am. J. Pub. Health 1339, 1340 (1999). 
131. Id. 
132.  The full scenario is as follows:  
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description, 16.8% of respondents said that John was likely or very 
likely to do something violent to another person.133 In the second scen-
ario, John was given characteristics of a person suffering from major 
depression.134 He was described as “feeling really down. . . . Even when 
good things happen, they don’t seem to make John happy. He pushes 
on through his days, but it is really hard.”135 In response to this descrip-
tion, 33.3% of respondents felt that John was likely or very likely to do 
something violent to another person.136 In the last scenario, John was 
described as a person with characteristics of schizophrenia.137 John was  
 John is a [ETHNICITY] man with an [EDUCATION LEVEL] edu-
cation. Up until a year ago, life was pretty okay for John. While 
nothing much was going wrong in John’s life he sometimes feels 
worried, a little sad, or has trouble sleeping at night. John feels 
that at times things bother him more than they bother other people 
and that when things go wrong, he sometimes gets nervous or 
annoyed. Otherwise John is getting along pretty well. He enjoys 
being with other people and although John sometimes argues with 
his family, John has been getting along pretty well with his family.  
 The full description of the vignettes is taken from Bruce G. Link et al., 
Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes, Dangerousness, and 
Social Distance, 89 Am. J. Pub. Health 1328, 1329 (1999). 
133. Pescosolido, supra note 130, at 1341 (noting that the other respondents 
answered as follows: Very likely: 4.3%; Somewhat likely: 12.5%; Not very 
likely: 45.9%; Not likely at all: 37.4%). 
134.  The full scenario is as follows:  
 John is a [ETHNICITY] man with an [EDUCATION LEVEL] edu-
cation. For the past two weeks John has been feeling really down. 
He wakes up in the morning with a flat heavy feeling that sticks 
with him all day long. He isn’t enjoying things the way he normally 
would. In fact nothing gives him pleasure. Even when good things 
happen, they don’t seem to make John happy. He pushes on through 
his days, but it is really hard. The smallest tasks are difficult to 
accomplish. He finds it hard to concentrate on anything. He feels out 
of energy and out of steam. And even though John feels tired, when 
night comes he can’t go to sleep. John feels pretty worthless and very 
discouraged. John’s family has noticed that he hasn’t been himself 
for about the last month and that he has pulled away from them. 
John just doesn’t feel like talking.  
 Link et al., supra note 132, at 1329.  
135. Id. 
136. Pescosolido, supra note 130, at 1341 (noting that the other respondents 
answered as follows: very likely: 9.2%; somewhat likely: 24.1%; not very likely: 
49.3%; not likely at all: 17.4%). 
137. Id. at 1340. The full scenario is as follows: 
John is a [ETHNICITY] man with an [EDUCATION LEVEL] edu-
cation. Up until a year ago, life was pretty okay for John. But then, 
things started to change. He thought that people around him were 
making disapproving comments and talking behind his back. John 
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“hearing voices even though no one else was around. These voices told 
him what to do and what to think.”138 When given this description, 
60.9% of respondents thought that John was likely or very likely to do 
something violent to another person.139 As the authors concluded, res-
pondents had “increased expectations of violence if they labeled the 
vignette person as having a mental illness.”140 
There are many reasons for this increase in the public perception 
that people with mental illness are more likely to be violent or danger-
ous to others. One possible explanation is that many people acquire 
much of their knowledge of mental illness from television and the news; 
one study found that 74% of Americans cited newspapers as their source 
of information about psychiatric disorders.141 Television and movies ab-
out mental illness often feature “plots and characters that connect men-
tal illness with violence or depict people with mental illness primarily 
as caricatures or stereotypes-subjects of humor or derision.”142 In news-
papers, stories involving homicide committed by a person with mental 
illness are more likely to receive front-page coverage, and more likely 
to receive a follow-up story.143 When stories are told about people with 
mental illness, moreover, they are most likely to involve a violent act,144 
 
was convinced that people were spying on him and that they could 
hear what he was thinking. John lost his drive to participle in his 
usual work and family activities and retreated to his home, eventually 
spending most of his day in his room. John was hearing voices even 
though no one else was around. These voices told him what to do 
and what to think. He has been living this way for six months.  
 Link et al., supra note 132, at 1329. 
138. Link et al., supra note 132, at 1329. 
139. Pescosolido, supra note 130, at 1341 (noting that the other respondents 
answered as follows: Very likely: 12.8%; Somewhat likely: 48.1%; Not very 
likely: 30.8%; Not likely at all: 8.3%). 
140. Id. at 1343. 
141. Otto Wahl, News Media Portrayal of Mental Illness: Implications for Public 
Policy, 46 Am. Behav. Scientist 1594, 1594 (2003). 
142. NAMI, Wonderland Premiere Brings Call on White House to Fight Stigma 
in Entertainment Industry, (March 20, 2000), https://www.nami.org/Press-
Media/Press-Releases/2000/Wonderland-Premiere-Brings-Call-on-White-
House-to [http://perma.cc/PL4P-FZ8F]. See also, e.g., Psycho (Paramount 
Pictures 1960); American Psycho (Lions Gate Films 2000); Friday the 
13th (Paramount Pictures 1980); The Shining (Warner Bros. 1980). 
143. Otto Wahl et al., Newspaper Coverage of Mental Illness: Is It Changing?, 
6 Psychiatric Rehabilitation Skills 9, 10–12 (2002) (reviewing various 
studies). 
144. Greg Philo et al., MEDIA AND MENTAL DISTRESS 50 (1996) (concluding 
that “this is a media world populated by ‘psychopaths,’ ‘maniacs,’ and 
‘frenzied knife men’”). This trend is not unique to the United States. See, 
e.g., Raymond Nairn et al., From Source Material To News Story In New 
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and the most common theme of stories about mental illness is the dang-
erousness of the mentally ill person.145 
Furthermore, when a person with a mental illness does commit a 
violent act, state legislatures often react by passing laws like New 
York’s Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act.146 New 
York’s law created a database of New Yorkers who are considered “too 
mentally unstable to carry firearms,” and contains approximately 
34,500 names.147 While defending the law, which was enacted in respon-
se to the Newtown Connecticut shooting in 2012, Mayor Cuomo noted, 
“God bless you, be a sportsman, be a hunter. We’re not against guns. 
But not guns for criminals and for the mentally ill.”148 It is difficult to 
miss the implicit link between criminality and mental illness in this 
statement, and many have criticized the law as further stigmatizing 
people with mental illness and reinforcing perceptions that people with 
mental illness are invariably violent. As one commentator noted, “[t]hat 
 
Zealand Print Media: A Prospective Study Of The Stigmatizing Processes 
In Depicting Mental Illness, 35 Austl. & N.Z. J. Psychiatry 654, 658 
(2001) (“Throughout the corpus of material, the themes and production 
practices we have described mutually reinforced and nuanced each other, 
consistently linking mental illness with violence and unpredictability.”). 
145. Wahl, supra note 143, at 14. Wahl selected 300 articles discussing mental 
illness from six U.S. newspapers, including the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 
the Boston Globe, and the St. Petersburg Times. He found that in 77 of the 
300 articles (or 23%) that discussed mental illness, the most common theme 
was that “people who have mental illness may be dangerous.” But see 
Phelan et al., supra note 127, at 203 (noting that “mentions of dangerousness 
were not significantly related to the frequency of reading the newspaper or 
of watching television”). 
146. See NY Mental Hyg. 9.46 Reporting Requirements for Mental Health 
Professionals (2013) (“Amendments to the Mental Hygiene Law will help 
ensure that persons who are mentally ill and dangerous cannot retain or 
obtain a firearm. First, mental health records that are currently sent to NIDCS 
for a federal background check will also be housed in a New York State 
database. A new Section 9.46 of the Mental Hygiene Law will require mental 
health professionals, in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, 
to report if an individual they are treating is likely to engage in conduct 
that will cause serious harm to him- or herself or others.”) NY A02388 
Memo, http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A02388&term= 
2013&Summary=Y&Memo=Y [https://perma.cc/7VCZ-8KF5]. 
147. Anemona Hartocollis, Mental Health Issues Put 34,500 on New York’s 
No-Guns List, N.Y. Times (Oct. 19, 2014), http://assembly.state.ny.us/ 
leg/?default_fld=&bn=A02388&term=2013&Summary=Y&Memo=Y 
[https://perma.cc/7VCZ-8KF5]. 
148. Anemona Hartocollis & Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Defends Law Denying Guns 
to Mentally Ill People, N.Y. Times (Oct. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/10/20/nyregion/cuomo-defends-law-denying-guns-to-mentally-ill-
people.html [https://perma.cc/Z2PT-M9JU]. 
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[number] seems extraordinarily high to me. Assumed dangerousness is 
a far cry from actual dangerousness.”149 
Finally, some authors have theorized that the change in the lang-
uage of commitment standards themselves and the widespread inclusion 
of language referring to dangerousness has actually increased stigma 
and the perception that mentally ill people are violent.150 One study 
found that when respondents were asked in 1950 to describe a person 
with mental illness, 24 out of 335 people (or 7.2%) mentioned violence, 
but only one of those people used the term “dangerous to self or oth-
ers.”151 When asked the same question in 1996, 75 out of 622 people (or 
12.1%) mentioned violence, but 33 people used the term “dangerousness 
to self or others.”152 In other words, people who used the phrase “danger-
ous to self or others” to describe mental illness increased “from 4.2% of 
respondents in 1950 to 44% of respondents in 1996.”153 The authors 
concluded that these results suggest “widespread public knowledge of 
the dangerousness criterion for involuntary commitment might indeed 
have fueled the stereotype that people with mental illnesses are danger-
ous.”154 The dangerousness standard itself may therefore reinforce the 
idea of a link between mental illness and dangerousness and “reproduce 
stereotypes depicting as threats to public safety persons who experience 
severe psychological distress or disturbances.”155 
There is some disagreement in the psychiatric community about 
the actual link between violence and mental illness, although most men-
tal health professionals and the APA generally caution against a direct 
 
149. Hartocollis, supra note 147. 
150. J.C. Phelan & B.G. Link, The Growing Belief that People with Mental 
Illnesses are Violent: The Role of the Dangerousness Criterion for Civil 
Commitment, 33 Soc. Psychiatry Psychiatr. Epidemiol. S7, S8 (1998). 
151. Id. at S9. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at S7. 
154. Id. at S10. The authors note however, that “we cannot draw such a conclusion 
without reservation. In particular, it is possible that more people would have 
mentioned violence in 1996 than in 1950 for other reasons, and that they 
simply used ‘dangerous to self or others’ as a familiar phrase with which to 
express their beliefs.” Id.  
155. Dallaire et al., supra note 109, at 693; see also id. at 692–93 (“Because the 
widely shared tendency to equate mental illness with dangerousness is 
manifested in the rationale for, and operationalization of, civil commitment 
laws, however they are written, a civil commitment system which couples 
mental illness with dangerousness has little or no effect on restraining comm-
ittals that would otherwise be made on the basis of need for treatment. The 
net result of a dangerousness criterion, then, may be to manifest, reinforce, 
and reproduce stereotypes depicting as threats to public safety persons who 
experience severe psychological distress or disturbances.”). 
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link between mental illness and violence or dangerousness.156 But some 
researchers have concluded that there is a link, and that major mental 
disorders, like schizophrenia and bipolar disorders are “associated with 
significantly higher risks for physical violence against others.”157 Other 
authors have argued that this correlation is so strong that “[t]he mental 
health community has to start by accepting that violent and antisocial 
behaviours are among the potential complications of having a schizo-
phrenic syndrome” and should respond accordingly by creating struct-
ured programs to manage “the active symptoms of the disorder [and] 
prevent the progress to violence.”158 
Other researchers have reached different results and present per-
suasive evidence that there is no causal link between mental illness and 
 
156. J. Arboleda-Florez, et al., Understanding Causal Paths Between Mental 
Illness and Violence, 33 Soc. Psychiatry & Psychiatric Epidemiology 
S38, S38 (1998); see also Am. Psychol. Ass’n (Apr. 21, 2014), http:// 
www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2014/04/mental-illness-crime.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/BT98-NFC8] (citing Jillian K. Peterson et al., How Often 
and How Consistently Do Symptoms Directly Precede Criminal Behavior 
Among Offenders With Mental Illness?, 38 L. & Hum. Behav. 439 (2014)). 
As Peterson et al. note, however,  
the study sample was relatively small . . . and excluded offenders 
with a violent index offense (like the mental health court pool from 
which it was drawn). Therefore the results may not generalize to 
‘violent offenders.’ This concern is only partly mitigated by the fact 
that nearly one fifth (17%) of the crimes analyzed in this study were 
violent or potentially violent because participants reported crimes 
other than their index offense. It is possible that the rate of direct 
crimes would differ in a sample with more violent offenses.  
 Jillian K. Peterson et al., How Often and How Consistently Do Symptoms 
Directly Precede Criminal Behavior Among Offenders With Mental Illness?, 
38 L. & Hum. Behav. 439, 446 (2014). 
157. Christian C. Joyal et al., Mental Disorders and Violence: A Critical Update, 
3 Current Psychiatry Revs. 33, 34 (2007) (noting that “[o]nce gender, 
age, socio-demographic and socio-economic status are taken into account, 
the overall risk for physical assault is generally estimated to be 3 to 5 times 
higher than that of the general population”). 
158. Paul Mullen, Schizophrenia and Violence: From Correlations to Preventive 
Strategies, 12 Advances in Psychiatric Treatment 239, 239, 243 (2006).  
There is a correlation between having a schizophrenic syndrome and 
increased rates of antisocial behavior in general and violence in part-
icular. The evidence that such associations are not just statistically but 
clinically and socially significant is now overwhelming. Why, if the 
connection is so clear, has it not been widely recognized by clinicians 
and service planners? 
 Id. at 239 (citations omitted). The author feels so strongly about this 
connection that the opening line of the abstract notes that “[p]eople with 
schizophrenia make a significant contribution to violence in our communities 
and, in so doing, often lay waste to their own lives.” Id. 
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violence in the general population.159 Violence is not predicted by men-
tal illness alone, and “[t]he predicted probability of violence for severe 
mental illness alone is approximately the same as for subjects with no 
severe mental illness.”160 Instead, people with mental illness who also 
had some other risk factor, especially substance abuse or a history of 
violence were at higher risk of violence. People with a severe mental 
illness and both substance abuse and a history of violence “showed 
nearly 10 times higher risk of violence compared with subjects with 
severe mental illness only.”161 But as the authors concluded, “If a person 
has severe mental illness without substance abuse and history of viol-
ence, he or she has the same chances of being violent during the next 3 
years as any other person in the general population.”162 
Furthermore, multiple studies have shown that people with serious 
mental illness are most likely to be violent during an initial psychotic 
episode before they have been diagnosed or treated,163 or when they 
 
159. See, e.g., Eric B. Elbogen & Sally C. Johnson, The Intricate Link Between 
Violence and Mental Disorder: Results From the National Epidemiologic 
Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, 66 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 
152 (2009). 
160. Id. at 155. 
161. Id. Other risk factors associated with a higher risk of violence included 
reporting parental physical abuse, witnessing parents physically fighting, 
parental criminal history, juvenile detention, perceiving threats, being unem-
ployed in the past year, being recently divorced, and being recently victimized. 
Id. at 154–155; see also Seena Fazel et al., Schizophrenia, Substance Abuse, 
and Violent Crime, 301 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 2016, 2021 (2009) (finding that 
“the association between schizophrenia and violent crime is minimal unless 
the patient is also diagnosed as having substance abuse comorbidity”). The 
authors found that, among patients without such comorbidity, the risk of 
increased violence, as compared to the general population or siblings without 
mental illness, was 1.2 to 1.3. Id. 
162. Elbogen & Johnson, supra note 159, at 157.  
163. Matthew M. Large & Olav Nielssen, Violence in First-Episode Psychosis: A 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 125 Schizophrenia Res. 209, 214 
(2011) (“The finding of high rates of violence among first-episode psychosis 
patients is consistent with the finding of a disproportionate number of hom-
icides, violent suicide attempts and serious harms such as cases of major self 
mutilation in first-episode psychosis compared to later in the course of the 
illness.”) (citations omitted); see also Olav Nielssen & Matthew Large, Rates 
of Homicide During the First Episode of Psychosis and After Treatment: A 
Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 36 Schizophrenia Bull. 702, 708 
(2010) (“The main findings of this study can be summarized as (i) approx-
imately 4 in 10 of the homicides committed by people with a psychotic illness 
occur before treatment, (ii) approximately 1 in 700 people with psychosis 
commit a homicide before treatment, (iii) approximately 1 in 10,000 patients 
with psychosis who have received treatment will commit a homicide each year, 
and (iv) the rate of homicide in psychosis before treatment is approximately 
15 times higher than the annual rate after treatment.”). 
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have discontinued treatment.164 But because many people with serious 
mental illness are unable to recognize the severity of their illness or 
their need for treatment—and because the state typically does not in-
tervene until people are dangerous—a small number of these people go 
without treatment until, paradoxically, they become violent. These vio-
lent acts and the defendant’s mental illness are then heavily publicized, 
further reinforcing the perception between mental illness and violence.165 
The pervasiveness of perceptions about the connection between mental 
illness and violence or dangerousness, coupled with the interpretation 
of gravely disabled grounds for commitment to require dangerousness 
may be further perpetuating this connection. 
V. The Aftermath: Effects of Deinstitutionalization 
and the Dangerousness Standard 
As commitment laws became stricter, more patients who would 
have previously been treated in a long-term inpatient facility were re-
turned to their communities. Civil rights and community mental health 
advocates believed that most people suffering from serious mental ill-
ness would be better served in their own communities.166 At the same 
time, well-meaning lawyers and mental health professions expected that 
people with mental illness would voluntarily seek that treatment and 
that treatment would be available to them in their communities. 
Deinstitutionalization and heighted commitment standards have 
made improvements in the lives of many people with mental illness.167 
 
164. E. Fuller Torrey, Stigma and Violence: Isn’t It Time to Connect the Dots?, 
37 Schizophrenia Bull. 892, 893 (2011) (citing various studies). 
165. E.g., Hipolito Corella, Tucson Shooting: No Mental Health Treatment for 
Loughner Before Giffords Rampage, Arizona Daily Star (Mar. 27, 2013), 
http://tucson.com/news/local/crime/tucson-shooting-no-mental-health-
treatment-for-loughner-before-giffords/article_70b5b03c-96f4-11e2-b7dc-
0019bb2963f4.html [http://perma.cc/H6B5-HQU6]; James Holmes Saw 
Three Mental Health Professionals Before Shooting, CBS News (Sept. 
19, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/james-holmes-saw-three-mental- 
health-professionals-before-shooting/ [http://perma.cc/7JGD-DS59]. 
166. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the 
Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1107, 1109 (1972) (“[E]ven if we concede that governments may hospit-
alize an ill person to protect him from himself, or to protect others from him, 
or simply to treat or care for him, these goals can generally be better served 
by keeping him in the community than by removing him.”). 
167. Davis et al., supra note 33, at 263; see also Frank & Glied, supra note 9, 
at 1 (“Almost all severely ill patients receive some treatment. That treatment, 
although not always entirely effective, is unlikely to be dangerous or inhumane. 
The living conditions of people with severe illnesses have generally improved 
at least as much as have conditions for the rest of society over the past five 
decades.”). 
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Access to mental health care has continued to improve and the quality 
of care is better than it was when deinstitutionalization began, espec-
ially in regards to medications available to treat chronic mental ill-
ness.168 Social welfare programs like Medicaid and Medicare, and SSI 
and SSDI have helped people with mental illness to obtain better hous-
ing and improved income status.169 Many of these improvements, how-
ever, are largely seen in people who are in the middle class, and in those 
who have less serious disorders.170 
For people with serious mental illness who are dependent on the 
state to provide mental health care and treatment, improvements in 
access to care and the quality of that care since deinstitutionalization 
have been more modest. Most communities have not developed approp-
riate structures to provide appropriate care to people with chronic and 
serious mental illness and psychiatric beds that were once available in 
state hospitals have not been recreated in the community. In order to 
live in communities, these individuals need community-based resources 
in place that assist them in obtaining appropriate mental health treat-
ment. Because these systems have not been sufficiently developed, peo-
ple suffering from serious mental illness continue to be overrepresented 
among the homeless, among the incarcerated, and among victims of 
violent crime.171 Furthermore, when people with serious mental illness 
or their families attempt to obtain care within communities, they often 
encounter “a fragmented array of public programs that are run out of 
a large number of distinct federal, state, and local government bureauc-
racies.”172 
Instead of receiving appropriate long-term care in their commun-
ities, many of these people have become “revolving-door patients,” tho-
se who have a serious mental disorder, do not voluntarily comply with 
treatment, and are unable to live successfully without treatment in the 
community.173 They often live on the fringes of their communities, 
where they deteriorate to the point that they meet emergency commit-
ment standards and are hospitalized, often in hospital emergency 
rooms.174 Long-term treatment is often not available, so patients are 
 
168. Davis et al., supra note 33, at 263. 
169. Id. 
170. Frank & Glied, supra note 9, at 1. 
171. Id. at 143. 
172. Id. at 144. 
173. Mark R. Munetz et al., The Ethics of Mandatory Community Treatment, 
31 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 173, 173 (2003). 
174. One can find examples of this phenomenon in most major cities around the 
country. See, e.g., Brian M. Rosenthal, ‘Boarding’ Mentally Ill Becoming 
Epidemic In State, Seattle Times (Oct. 5, 2013), http://seattletimes.com/ 
html/localnews/2021968893_psychiatricboardingxml.html [http://perma.cc/ 
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held just long enough to stabilize on medication and regain competency, 
where they are again released into the community. Once there, they 
discontinue treatment, decompensate, and the cycle begins again.175 
One reason for unavailability of long-term psychiatric treatment 
following deinstitutionalization is the rapid decrease of psychiatric in-
patient hospital beds in the United States; beds that were not recreated 
in communities after state facilities were closed.176 Residents in state 
hospitals numbered almost 559,000 people in 1955; by 2003 that number 
had fallen to 47,000.177 And while we know that most people with serious 
mental illness no longer live in state institutions, it is harder to say 
where they are living now. Many live with family members, who have 
once again been tasked with the primary responsibilities of caring for 
loved ones with mental illness when those individuals are too ill to care 
for themselves, but do not meet a civil determination of dangerousness. 
One study interviewed mothers of adult children with serious mental 
illness, and described the difficulty family members face waiting “for 
the inevitable point at which their children would meet criteria to be 
 
53U9-DQ52]; Yesenia Amaro, Inundated By The Mentally Ill, Valley 
Emergency Rooms Close To Ambulances, Las Vegas Review-Journal 
(Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/inundated-mentally-
ill-valley-emergency-rooms-close-ambulances [http://perma.cc/CCP4-AX62]. 
175. See Munetz et al., supra note 173, at 174 (noting that this particularly affects 
patients “who do not believe they are ill or need treatment”). 
176. This Article does not address in detail, but does not mean to ignore, the 
profound impact that a lack of available beds might have on psychiatrists’ 
decisions to recommend civil commitment. Faced with a shortage of inpatient 
psychiatric beds: 
  [A] clinician might rightly engage in a sort of a triage. The patients 
who are thought to be most in need of hospitalization are committed, 
while patients who constitute somewhat less urgent cases, although 
still meeting commitment standards, are turned away. This low-
visibility decision depends not on judges’ enforcing the state’s commit-
ment laws, but on emergency room and admitting office clinicians’ 
attempting to protect their institutions from being overwhelmed. 
 Applebaum, supra note 113, at 52. 
177. Testa & West, supra note 7, at 33; see also Davis et al., supra note 33, at 
259; No Room at the Inn: Trends and Consequences of Closing Public 
Psychiatric Hospitals 2005-2010, Treatment Advocacy Ctr. (July 19, 
2012) (noting that in 2010, the number of state psychiatric beds per capita 
in the United States was nearly the same as the number of state psychiatric 
beds per capita in 1850 (14 beds per 100,000 individuals)); Torrey et al., 
supra note 32, at 5 (finding that the state with the most available public 
psychiatric beds per 100,000 population in 2005 was Mississippi (49.7), while 
the states with the fewest beds were Nevada (5.1) and Arizona (5.9)). 
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hospitalized involuntarily.”178 As one woman described it, “It’s like you 
wait till something horrible happens before something can be done.”179 
For those without family to help, the situation is worse. While the 
numbers of people with mental illness receiving SSI has risen, those 
people are still about 60% more likely than people without mental ill-
ness to report incomes below $20,000 a year.180 “For this group, living 
circumstances depend critically on access to publicly funded benefits, 
but benefits are meager and leave most people with severe illnesses in 
poverty.”181 Moreover, as the price of housing has increased, available 
subsidized housing has not increased enough to keep housing affordable 
for people with mental illness who rely on public benefits.182 
Another commonly referenced result of deinstitutionalization and 
heightened commitment standards is increased rates of homelessness 
among people with serious mental illness. Recent estimates suggest that 
more than 25% of the homeless population in the United States has a 
serious mental illness,183 while only 4.1% of the general population 
suffers from serious mental illness.184 One study in Ohio found that 36% 
of study participants were homeless six months after discharge from a  
178. Darcy Ann Copeland & MarySue V. Heilemann, Getting “to the Point”: 
The Experience of Mothers Getting Assistance for Their Adult Children 
Who Are Violent and Mentally Ill, 57 Nursing Res. 136, 139 (2008). 
179. Id. The sampled mothers noted a desire for their children to have earlier 
access to mental health treatment:  
  The mothers felt that their desire for early intervention was in their 
children’s best interests. Also, they did not want to be victimized 
violently. These mothers repeatedly voiced their frustration at having 
to wait until violence occurred before being able to access mental 
health treatment for their children. This situation resulted in worse 
outcomes for both mothers and their children. 
 Id. at 142. 
180. Sherry A. Glied & Richard G. Frank, Better but Not Best: Recent Trends 
in the Well-Being of The Mentally Ill, 28 Health Aff. 637, 645 (2009). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. (“Improvements in living conditions that might have been generated by 
increases in receipt of public benefits were offset by the increase in housing 
prices in many areas.”). 
183. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Servs. Admin., Current 
Statistics on the Prevalence and Characteristics of People 
Experiencing Homelessness in the United States (2011); see also 
Laurence Roy et al., Criminal Behavior and Victimization Among Homeless 
Individuals with Severe Mental Illness: A Systematic Review, 65 Psychiatric 
Servs. 739, 739 (2014) (noting that “between 20% and 50% of homeless 
adults also have a severe mental illness”). 
184. Nat’l Inst. of Mental Health, Serious Mental Illness Among 
Adults (2012), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/statistics/SMI_AASR.shtml 
[http://perma.cc/U66H-BNL4]. 
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psychiatric facility.185 Another study in Massachusetts found among 187 
patients with serious mental illness, 17% were “predominantly home-
less” and 10% were “occasionally homeless” in the six months after 
discharge from a state psychiatric hospital.186 
The effects of deinstitutionalization and heighted commitment 
standards can also be seen in the increase in rates of mentally ill people 
in jails and prisons.187 Among state prison inmates, approximately 24% 
have a recent history of a mental health problem.188 Another recent 
study reviewed the prevalence of serious mental illness in jail inmates 
in New York and Maryland.189 The researchers found that rates of ser-
ious mental illness in women were 31%, while comparable rates among 
men were 14.5%.190 If we generalize these findings to the 13 million 
 
185. John R. Belcher, Rights Versus Needs of Homeless Mentally Ill Persons, 
33 Soc. Work 398, 399–400 (2001) (“[N]arrow interpretation of commitment 
criteria by service providers and other mental health professionals contributed 
to mental deterioration and homelessness for some respondents.”). 
186. Robert E. Drake et al., Housing Instability and Homelessness Among Aftercare 
Patients of an Urban State Hospital, 40 Psychiatric Servs. 46, 49 (1989). 
See also Roy et al., supra note 183, at 743 (noting that homeless people with 
mental illness are also significantly more likely to be arrested for crimes). 
187. Torrey, supra note 4, at 128–29. 
188. Dep’t of Just., Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates 
(2006). The study used the following methodology:  
  A recent history of mental health problems was measured by several 
questions in the BJS’ inmate surveys. Offenders were asked about 
whether in the past 12 months they had been told by a mental health 
professional that they had a mental disorder or because of a mental 
health problem had stayed overnight in a hospital, used prescribed 
medication, or received professional mental health therapy. 
 Id. Jail inmates had slightly lower rates of recent mental health problems 
(21%) and federal prisoners had the lowest rate (14%). When asked about 
mental health problems that were not recent, that is those that had not 
required treatment in the past twelve months, the numbers jumped to 56% 
for state prisoners, 64% for jail inmates, and 45% for federal prisoners. Id. 
See also Christine M. Sarteschi, Mentally Ill Offenders Involved with the 
U.S. Criminal Justice System: A Synthesis, SAGE Open 1, 8 (2013) (“The 
most common types of psychological disorders found among inmates, according 
to government and congressional surveys and data collected from studies in 
the literature, include anxiety, affective, thought, and substance abuse dis-
orders.”). 
189. Henry J. Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among Jail 
Inmates, 60 Psychiatric Servs. 761, 761 (2009) (including schizophrenia, 
schizophrenia spectrum disorder, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, 
brief psychotic disorder, delusional disorder, and psychotic disorder not 
otherwise specified). 
190. Id. at 764. 
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annual jail admissions in the United States, there were about two mill-
ion annual bookings of people with serious mental illness in 2007.191 
People with serious mental illness are also more likely than people with-
out mental illness to be arrested. For instance, one study in Massachu-
setts found that among people with serious mental illness, 28% of them 
had been arrested in the past ten years.192 
Although several studies have shown that people with mental illness 
are overrepresented in the prison population, these studies should not 
be read to suggest a link between mental illness and criminal behav-
ior.193 Instead, some authors have suggested that the large numbers of 
people with mental illness who are incarcerated might reflect a lack of 
access to appropriate mental health care: because people with mental 
illness regularly encounter obstacles to treatment and inadequate treat-
ment, this “results in patients being arrested for both violent and non-
violent crimes. Often such charges are based on behaviors that are dir-
ect manifestations of the patients’ then untreated symptoms, such as 
paranoia leading to trespassing or grandiosity resulting in breaking and 
entering.”194 
Furthermore, while heightened commitment standards were meant 
to reduce coercion of people with mental illness, many people with men-
tal illness are already experiencing some type of state involvement in 
their receipt of the mental health services they do receive, and often 
these services involve conditions. People with mental illness regularly 
come into contact with various state agencies, including mental health 
agencies, social service agencies, and the criminal justice system, all of 
 
191. Id. 
192. William H. Fisher et al., Patterns and Prevalence of Arrest in a Statewide 
Cohort of Mental Health Care Consumers, 57 Psychiatric Servs. 1623, 
1625 (2005). Of the total arrests, 13.6% were for crimes including violence 
against other people; the remaining arrests were for crimes against public 
order, property crimes, motor vehicle offenses, less serious crimes against 
persons, drug offenses, public decency offenses, assault and battery on a police 
officer, firearm violations, and miscellaneous offenses. Id. Men were more 
likely to be arrested than women (36.1% of men with serious mental illness 
had experienced an arrest, while only 17.5% of women had been arrested in 
the previous ten years), and non-whites were more likely to be arrested than 
whites (26.5% of white individuals with serious mental illness had been arrested 
in the past ten years, while 33.3% of non-whites with serious mental illness 
had been arrested). Id. at 1326. 
193. See Hiday, supra note 6, at 62 (finding that people with serious mental 
illness are about two-and-a-half times more likely to be the victim of a 
violent crime). 
194. Marie E. Rueve, Violence and Mental Illness, 5 Psychiatry 34, 36 (2008). 
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which apply some leverage to the individual in an attempt to improve 
treatment compliance.195 
One recent study found that between 12 and 20% of people who 
are receiving treatment for mental illness have received either out-
patient or inpatient commitment orders at some point during their liv-
es, and nearly three-quarters “reported experiencing other kinds of lev-
erage applied through the legal or social welfare system to improve their 
treatment adherence.”196 People who had a history of civil commitment 
were also more likely to have been ordered to seek treatment as a result 
of a criminal offense, or ordered to participate in treatment as a condit-
ion of receiving social security benefits.197 They were more likely to have 
lived in some type of subsidized housing where treatment was mandated 
as a condition of occupancy.198 Furthermore, people with some history 
of civil commitment often reported pressure from medical personnel and 
family members to comply with prescribed medication and treatment 
recommendations.199 
Most people with serious mental illness therefore do not just ex-
perience coercion if they are civilly committed—instead they experience 
coercion at all levels of their involvement with the mental health sys-
tem, in their receipt of social benefits, and through their involvement 
with the criminal justice system.200 The small numbers of mentally ill 
people whose only experience with mandated mental health treatment 
is civil commitment or a related civil court treatment order report low 
 
195. Marvin S. Swartz et al., Use of Outpatient Commitment or Related Civil 
Court Treatment Orders in Five U.S. Communities, 57 Psychiatric Servs. 
343, 349 (2006). 
196. Id. at 346–47. 
197. Id. at 346. This study sampled: 
  A total of 1,011 adult outpatients recruited from sites that provide 
public psychiatric services in five cities across the United States, 
including Chicago; Durham, North Carolina; San Francisco; Tampa; 
and Worcester, Massachusetts. . . . Recruitment criteria specified 
that participants had to be aged 18 to 65 years, English or Spanish 
speaking, and in treatment during the past six months for a mental 
disorder, excluding those with only a substance use disorder. 
 Id. at 344. 
198. Id. at 346. 
199. See id. (“[A] history of outpatient commitment or similar civil court-ordered 
treatment was not significantly associated with satisfaction with mental health 
treatment or perceived sense of autonomy in everyday affairs.”). 
200. The groups of people with mental illness most likely to be subject to a civil 
commitment order are those who have poor social support, a history of 
violence, and a history of involvement with the police. The orders are also 
more common for people who live in group facilities and have co-occurring 
substance abuse problems. Swartz et al., supra note 195, at 347. 
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perceived coercion and high treatment satisfaction, “perhaps because 
their singular experiences with civil court treatment orders alone, with-
out other types of leverage, identifies a group with a more benign course 
and a successful return to treatment adherence.”201 In contrast, people 
who have felt coerced by several different forms of leverage in their 
receipt of mental health services “likely had a more tumultuous course 
in which multiple agencies and actors attempted to ensure treatment 
adherence.”202 
VI. Recommendations: The Need for a Broader 
Interpretation of Gravely Disabled  
Commitment Standards 
While deinstitutionalization and heighted commitment standards 
have therefore helped many individuals, some authors have noted that 
for others, it has been “one of the great social disasters of recent Am-
erican history.”203 For many people with serious mental illness, espec-
ially the poor and people with chronic illnesses, the complexities of 
access to psychiatric care and the decentralization of services have cre-
ated new and sometimes insurmountable obstacles to receiving care and 
services.204 Furthermore, while heighted commitment standards were 
intended to reduce coercion, protect patient’s civil liberties and ensure 
they receive the best possible treatment in the least restrictive setting, 
the requirement that the patient pose a danger to herself or others often 
means the person’s health must deteriorate significantly before she will 
meet the commitment standard.205 In many cases, this heightened stan-
dard has resulted in the marginalization of people with serious mental 
illness into poverty and homelessness, into prisons, and into a variety 
of situations where they are at higher risk of becoming victims of cri-
mes.206 
This is not a simple problem, nor one with an elegant solution. 
Improving access to mental health care will require reforms at all levels 
of government. Improving access to mental health care for individuals 
 
201. Id. at 348. 
202. Id. 
203. Torrey, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that “[t]here are two major origins of the 
disaster—deinstitutionalization and the legal profession.) 
204. Davis et al., supra note 33, at 263. These complexities are further exacerbated 
by the rise of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), private psychiatric 
hospitals, and Managed Behavioral Health Organizations (MBHOs), all of 
which have impacted access to treatment for people with severe mental illness. 
Id. at 260; see also Glied & Frank, supra note 180, at 637 (“[N]ot all people 
with mental health problems have shared in these improvements.”). 
205. Testa & West, supra note 7, at 34.  
206. Hiday, supra note 6, at 62. 
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with serious mental illness is made more difficult by the complexities of 
serious mental illness and by the fact that many individuals are so ill 
they do not recognize a need for treatment. Creating systems that 
meaningfully improve access to mental health care, however, takes time. 
This Article does not propose that we abandon those efforts, but that 
in the meantime, courts and psychiatrists use systems that are already 
in place to provide care to individuals with serious mental illness who 
are otherwise living in deplorable conditions, on the streets, in poverty, 
or in the criminal justice system. One existing system is civil commit-
ment and gravely disabled grounds for commitment. While all people 
have certain rights to be free from unwanted medical treatment, for 
people with serious mental illness who are homeless or in prison, those 
civil liberties are an abstraction, safeguarded for them by a system that 
is not otherwise allowing them access to shelter and basic medical 
care. As one psychiatrist famously noted, these patients are “dying with 
their rights on.”207 
States have an obligation to provide citizens with appropriate men-
tal health care and a more robust civil commitment standard, one that 
more fully embraces the state’s parens patriae authority and allows for 
commitment on gravely disabled grounds absent a finding of dangerous-
ness could help provide that care. Although the police power has be-
come the primary justification for civil commitment in the United 
States since deinstitutionalization, a requirement that a person be found 
dangerous to themselves or others before the state takes responsibility 
for providing mental health care is harming people with serious mental 
illness. Moreover, because many of these individuals lack insight into 
their need for treatment, they often do not voluntarily seek treatment, 
which can cause their illnesses to manifest “disturbed and disturbing 
behavior that can result in incarceration from stable housing arrange-
ments, limited access to housing, and increased vulnerability to crime 
and abuse.”208 
 
207. Darold A. Treffert, Dying With Their Rights On, 130 Am. J. Psychiatry 
1041 (1937). Treffert described Wisconsin’s dangerousness standard for civil 
commitment:  
  Under this law, a 49-year-old anorexic woman starved herself to death; 
a 70-year-old man died a self-perpetuating, metabolic, toxic death; 
and a 19-year-old student, while unable to qualify for commitment 
under the new guidelines, was able to hang herself. Each of these 
patients needed commitment; none qualified. Each outcome was 
entirely predictable. Each of these patients went to his or her grave 
with his rights entirely intact. 
 Id. 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 4–5. 
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Civil commitment and the dangerousness standard have become 
almost synonymous in the minds of the public, the mental health comm-
unity, and the legal system. But the primary use of a dangerousness 
standard grounded in states’ police powers is still failing a small but 
vulnerable population—individuals with untreated serious and chronic 
mental illness. Until we can create a better system—one that effectively 
provides community-based resources and treatment to individuals suff-
ering from serious mental illness—courts and psychiatrists should more 
readily base commitment adjudications on states’ parens patriae auth-
ority, including gravely disabled standards that allow for commitment 
when an individual is unable to meet her basic needs but is not danger-
ous to herself. This ground for commitment is already available in most 
state statutes, but the connection between mental illness, civil commit-
ment, and dangerousness is so strong that many psychiatrists and 
courts are not interpreting these available standards to provide people 
with mental illness the care and treatment they need. The result is that 
many with serious mental illness are not receiving treatment at all. 
Conclusion 
States are empowered—and obligated—to provide appropriate 
mental health care to citizens under the parens patriae authority. Many 
states legislatures recognize this obligation and have amended civil com-
mitment statutes to allow for the commitment and treatment of people 
with serious mental illness before they reach the point of dangerousness. 
Statutes that allow for commitment upon a finding of grave disability 
when a person is unable to meet her basic needs for survival are an 
appropriate exercise of states’ parens patriae authority. However, con-
tinued perceptions of the link between mental illness and violence, 
coupled with a lack of awareness and underuse of those statutes have 
resulted in commitment standards that effectively commit people only 
when they are dangerous, which is often far past the point that they 
are in need of help, homeless, or imprisoned. In turn, many people who 
need treatment, but are not dangerous to themselves or others, receive 
little or no mental health care. 
While all people have certain rights to be free from unwanted med-
ical treatment, those civil liberties are perhaps less imperative than 
more immediate needs like shelter and basic medical and mental health 
care. States’ continued and primary use of a dangerousness standard in 
civil commitment proceedings does not meet our obligations to people 
with serious mental illness. Courts and psychiatrists should recognize 
states’ obligations to provide health care to citizens with serious mental 
illness by interpreting gravely disabled statutes to allow for commit-
ment when an individual is unable to provide for her basic needs but 
does not pose a danger to herself. 
